Information technology social engineering: an academic definition and study of social engineering - analyzing the human firewall by Evans, Nathaniel Joseph
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
2009
Information technology social engineering: an
academic definition and study of social engineering
- analyzing the human firewall
Nathaniel Joseph Evans
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd
Part of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Evans, Nathaniel Joseph, "Information technology social engineering: an academic definition and study of social engineering -
analyzing the human firewall" (2009). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 10709.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/10709
   
Information technology social engineering:  an academic definition and study of social 
engineering - analyzing the human firewall 
 
by 
 
 
Nathaniel Joseph Evans 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the graduate faculty 
 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
Major:  Computer Engineering  
 
Program of Study Committee: 
Doug Jacobson, Major Professor 
Kevin Amidon 
Thomas Daniels 
Mani Mina 
Roger Smith 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Iowa State University 
 
Ames, Iowa 
 
2009 
 
Copyright © Nathaniel Joseph Evans, 2009.  All rights reserved. 
ii 
DEDICATION  
 This dissertation is dedicated first to my grandmother, Mary Lou Villinis.  Without her 
wonderful example of kindness and patience, I could never have completed this.  Second, I 
would like to dedicate this to Walt Disney, who has been a guiding light for me for since my 
internship in 2003.  Disney said, “If you can dream it, you can do it,” and that has been the magic 
that has gotten me so far in this process. When you put your mind to something, it’s amazing 
how things fall into place.  To all of my friends, pets, and family, this work is also dedicated to 
you.  Your encouragement and support has been a blessing throughout this process.  I could not 
ask for a better family, more loving pets, or better friends.  
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 1 
Why should I care about social engineering?  Is this even a problem? 1 
The Philosophy of Security 4 
What is This Paper About? 5 
Summary of Chapters 7 
 
CHAPTER 2.  DEFINITIONS 9 
CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW 16 
Introduction 16 
Curriculum Research 16 
Agent Based Research 16 
History 17 
Trust Model 18 
Missing Pieces 19 
 
CHAPTER 4:  CONCEPTUAL MODELS 21 
Introduction 21 
Psychology 22 
Neuro-linguistic Programming 29 
Process 33 
Conclusion 34 
IT Networks and Nazism:  Unwitting participation 34 
The Nazi State 36 
Living in the Nazi State 41 
IT Networks 43 
Conclusion 45 
 
CHAPTER 5.  EXPERIMENTAL MEASUREMENTS 46 
Method 46 
Results 48 
 
CHAPTER 6.  CONSEQUENCES AND COROLLARIES 58 
Hardships 58 
Benefits 59 
Purpose of Work 59 
Future Work 60 
iv 
 
CHAPTER 7:  CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTION 62 
APPENDIX A.  SURVEY INSTRUMENT USED 64 
APPENDIX B.  SURVEY RESULTS 68 
APPENDIX C.  LIST OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING PENETRATION TESTERS 70 
REFERENCES 85 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 90 
1 
CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
In order to succeed in this world, one must have knowledge:  knowledge to do one’s 
craft, knowledge to apply one’s knowledge, etc.  In short, knowledge is power.  On the flip side, 
any company, government, individual, or power can be destroyed due to a lack of knowledge.   
Security deals with keeping knowledge hidden and only available to those who need the 
knowledge.  It’s an extremely difficult job because security efforts must find each and every hole 
through which knowledge can slide though.  All an attacker needs to do is find one hole, while, 
theoretically, the defender has to find and fix all holes. 
 People have knowledge and people control knowledge, whether through a computer, 
papers, or memory; people are ultimately in charge; and people are a hole in security.  In order to 
fully understand security, people must be understood, specifically people’s relationship with 
information technology networks.   
 However, very little existing research has studied the relationship of people to 
information technology networks.  This work plans to contribute to the body of research that 
exists about social engineering to try to define and understand the problem of social engineering 
so eventually solutions can exist that will increase the security of knowledge and eliminate the 
security hole people so often create.  
 
Why Should I Care About Social Engineering?  Is This Even a Problem? 
Over the past six days (June 1, 2009 through June 7, 2009), there have been 12 social 
engineering stories on Google.  These include:   
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• a new scareware—a form of software which scares the installer into installing something 
detrimental to their system—introduced on Twitter, which makes the users believe they 
have a virus and the tool will remove it (Leyden, “Twitter Trends Exploited to Promote 
Scareware,” par. 1-2). 
• an article in PC Magazine detailing how malware from social engineering attackers 
outweigh malware installed through technical means by 10 to 1 (Seltzer, “Drive-by 
Attacks vs. Social Engineering,” par. 1-2). 
• a flurry of phishing attacks targeting bank customers of Commonwealth Bank 
(Constantin, “Flurry of Phishing Attacks Targeting Commonwealth Bank,” par. 1-2). 
• a story about a recently released keylogger, a piece of software that records key strokes.  
The story includes tips and suggestions on how to install the software on an unknowing 
person’s computer (Battersby, “Sector Pro 2009,” par. 1-2). 
 
Over the last month, this number of stories increases to 250 stories, with and a little over 700 in 
the past six months.  Clearly social engineering is making some headlines and is being featured 
in stories containing a variety of topics and ideas.  However, let us look at some specific stories 
and surveys to see what type of mess are we dealing with.   
 
An article published in 2008, stated that “Millennials buck IT security policies.”  This 
article explained how younger people are more inclined to combine personal Web applications 
with business applications.  For example, according to the survey, 75% of employees 28 years or 
younger check personal e-mail at work compared to 54% of other workers,  66% accessed 
Facebook or MySpace compared to 13% of other workers, and 51% access personal finance 
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applications compared with 27% of older workers.  75% of them admitted to downloading 
software and installing it compared to 25% of the older workers, even when this downloading 
was against company policy.  (Tucci, “'Millennials' Buck IT Security Policies,” par.  1-2).  The 
claim that “Millennials buck IT security policies” is a dangerous claim as those Millennials are 
the future of the industry.  As people get more and more electronically interconnected as the 
world metaphorically flattens, it will be interesting to see how this apathy shown by Millenials 
effects security.   
 Another story published earlier in the year shows that men are more likely than women to 
fall for Internet fraud.  In fact, the Internet crime center shows that men lost $1.67 to every $1 
lost by women.  According to the author, "Men tend to fall victim ... to business investment 
schemes and some other schemes that have a higher dollar loss...  Total losses from 2007 
complaints came to $239 million, up $40 million from 2006.”  (McMillian, “Men Fall Harder 
Than Women for Internet Fraud, Study Finds,” par 1-2).  The last line in this article about the 
total losses is the most intriguing to me.  When scamming becomes profitable, it matters less and 
less how legal it is.   
 “The Human Factor of Corporate Security,” a story published a couple months later, 
showed that anyone, knowingly or not, can be recruited to spy against his or her interests or 
company.  (Chabrow, “The Human Factor of Corporate Security,” par. 1-2). Even the most loyal 
person can hurt the company by believing that they are helping the company.  This idea of doing 
a favor and the concept of framing will be something I discuss about in a following chapter and 
is rooted deeply in psychology.   
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The Philosophy of Security 
Security itself can take on many definitions and ideals.  In order to understand how social 
engineering fits into the picture of security, we must first understand what I would like to refer to 
as the philosophy of security.   
 Companies and people have tried to define this term, the philosophy of security.  The 
biggest problem is that security keeps changing, and what was a good practice or idea one day is 
outdated the next.  This reminds me of a quote from a song by Weird Al Yankovic: “You say 
you have had your desktop for over a week, throw that junk away man, it’s an antique.  Your 
laptop is a month old, well that’s great, if you could use a nice heavy paperweight...”  Security is 
a very fast-paced, cutting-edge field and the specifics change on an almost daily basis.  Security 
mechanism that were valid today may not be valid tomorrow.   As such, research much be done 
to continue to innovate defenses in all of security.   
Moreover, security needs to be thought of as a process and not as individual hardware or 
software technologies. This way when technology changes, as it inevitably does, the process can 
easily be applied instead of needing to change.  This makes the policies much more realistic and 
thought out.  Another metaphor to look at the difference between process versus specific 
knowledge is the difference between a university’s bachelor’s degree program and a technology 
institute’s bachelor’s degree program.  You could say both teach science; however, the university 
teaches the concepts involved in science, how to think, and how to apply your knowledge even 
when the current technology changes, while the technical institute teaches what is needed to 
know to do the job now.  Right out of school, the technical institute student has an advantage 
because he/she knows the most current ideas, but once those change, the university student 
becomes much more attractive.   The process is more important than the specifics!   
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 Ira Winkler stated the overall technology security concept very well:   
For example, a car is extremely complicated, probably more complicated than computers.  
Not only do you have to worry about the car itself, you have to worry about other drivers 
on the road, criminals who will vandalize or steal the car, failure of different components 
of the car, filling the car with gas, changing the oil, red lights, street signs, emergency 
vehicles, and so on.  There is an infinite number of ways that you can be hurt either 
through your own actions or those of others.  This could be very overwhelming, yet 
people get in their car every day and generally survive. (Winkler 13)   
People seem to classify computers as something much more complicated than a car.  If someone 
believes that something is impossible then it normally is.  The approach to the idea of security 
needs to be manageable and positive.  Savvy Internet users have no special training but only a 
little common sense and some very basic knowledge.   
The idea of security comes with a series of questions, and this is the best way to think 
about this problem.  How do you perceive what you are securing?  Do you believe it is possible 
to secure said object?  Is security a ubiquitous part of overall operations?  How these questions 
are answered determines security. 
In short, anyone can be taught to do a competent job in security.  There is nothing special 
the average person has to know to decently secure his/her computer just like there is nothing 
special a driver has to know to drive his/her car.  The driver doesn’t need to be an auto-mechanic 
and the computer user doesn’t need to be a security engineer.  Everyone just needs to believe that 
security is possible.   
 
What is This Paper About? 
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So now that we understand how to think about security, what is the rest of this paper 
about?  As mentioned above, people are clearly the biggest problem in security.  A person’s 
mind is fairly easy to manipulate as shown in the fact that scams have been so successful and 
have been around since the 1800s.  For instance, in 1849 William Thompson was tried and 
convicted as a “confidence man” who would ask people to borrow their watch and walk off with 
it (Halttunen 9).  And before that a Scottish con-man tried to attract investors and settlers for a 
country which didn’t exist, which he called Poyais (Sinclair 20).   
 In addition, people write all the software and design all the hardware, which have flaws 
that hackers or crackers take advantage of.  Not only is a person’s mind not to be trusted but also 
the actions that mind makes the person take.  In short, we can blame every security breech on a 
person somewhere.   
 This dissertation has a threefold purpose all based on this idea that people are to blame 
for security problems.  First, I hope this will show that social engineering is definitely a problem 
that needs to be researched further.  To do this, I developed a survey and had agents perform a 
small social engineering penetration test on 64 companies.  Using the data collected, I will show 
that social engineering is a problem and even draw some parallels between common security 
practices and the effectiveness against the ever changing attacks using social engineering.  
Second, I will help define the concept of social engineering, which is much more of a debated 
and confused term then most people realize.  This will help people know what is included in the 
term and what is excluded from the term.  Plus, I hope this helps clarify how complicated of an 
idea social engineering is.  Third, I will provide a starting framework to help answer the common 
questions about social engineering:  How is a social engineering attack performed?  Why is the 
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attack successful?  I hope to show some of the concepts and ideas that make sense and are 
commonly accepted in psychology and history and how they apply to social engineering.   
 
This dissertation will show that people are not only to blame for every hole in security but also  
are a large hole in every company no matter size or specific type.  Security tells us we need to 
find a method to fix this hole and prevent the vulnerability people present from being exploited.  
This dissertation will mention a variety of vulnerabilities people present in the security paradigm 
but will not lay out specific defenses for these attacks.   
 
Summary of Chapters 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The introduction will include an overview of the problem, including why it’s important, a 
summary of new stories that exists in this area, and a discussion of how social engineering has 
not been explored in any sort of academic sense and is a weak link in security.       
 
Chapter 2: Definitions  
In this section, I show all the diverse definitions that exist for the term “social 
engineering.”  I plan to compare and contrast these definitions and define my own Information 
Technology Social Engineering (ITSE) term.   
 
Chapter 3: Literature Review 
In this chapter, I will show what areas have been well researched within the social 
engineering subject and where there are holes.   
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Chapter 4: Measurements and results  
In this chapter, I will detail the method I used to obtain this data, explain the data itself, 
explain how I analyzed the data, and explain the results of the analysis.  I also discuss the results 
given by “other” tests and publications and see if my results match what was stated but not 
shown in other publications.    
 
Chapter 5: Conceptual reasons and models 
In Chapter 4, I analyze a few different models of social engineering.  One is the 
relationship between IT networks and the German Nazi party, which will be introduced in this 
chapter for the first time.  The others will be analysis and summaries of already published 
models.  In short, this section is an answer to the questions of "Why is social engineering a 
problem?"  and “How is a social engineering attack performed.” 
 
Chapter 6: Corollaries and consequences 
In this chapter, I will explain the parts of this research that could be expanded, and I offer 
some ideas and extensions for future work.   
 
Chapter 7:  Conclusion and contribution 
This chapter will wrap up everything discussed earlier in the dissertation.   
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CHAPTER 2.  DEFINITIONS 
In this section I define terms and abbreviations I will use throughout the paper as well as 
spend considerable analysis on the core term for this dissertation, social engineering.  The goal 
of this section is to clear up misconceptions that may exist.     
 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS):  This department is charged with “leading the 
unified national effort to secure our country against those who seek to disrupt the American way 
of life“ (DHS, par. 1).  This includes the obvious:  protecting against hackers, terrorists, and 
criminals, but also includes natural disasters.  DHS focuses on protecting the nation against 
current and future threats.  As such, DHS performs a variety of disaster recovery tests on various 
places across the nation.  
 
Social engineering:  This section will elaborate on the definition of social engineering as it is 
used in information technology circles.  There are many definitions out there and this section will 
analyze them and see what common threads tie them all together.   
 First, let us analyze the basic definition of social engineering.  To people familiar with 
information technology, social engineering has many definitions, but even people outside of the 
field think of negative connotations for the term social engineering.  This term makes people 
think of and remember the Nazi party “engineering” its citizens to be the perfect race.  A simple 
Google search will reveal many places where social engineering can be applied as “the 
government engineering its people through social means.”  As you will see in Chapter 3, many 
similarities connect this definition with the definition used here.   
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To help separate the Nazi idea of social engineering from the hacker idea of social 
engineering, a new term was introduced called Information Technology Social Engineering, or 
ITSE (pronounced “itsy”).  However, some controversy exists about ITSE’s definitions, 
particularly about ITSE’s nature and goals.  The argument about the nature of ITSE comes from 
the idea that social engineering can be done without the use of a computer; so, it is technical or 
psychological?  Does there need to be a technical piece of the manipulation to constitute ITSE or 
is being a run-of-the-mill con man sufficient?   
 The second argument revolves around the goals of ITSE.  Generally, most authors agree 
that IT social engineering attacks have the goal of collecting a certain amount of data to be used 
later in a technical attack or a “hack” however others say that the goals don’t matter and any 
motivation still counts as social engineering.     
 So, let us now take a look at some common information sources to see what everyone 
thinks about the definition of ITSE   
 Wikipedia defines ITSE as, “the act of manipulating people into performing actions or 
divulging confidential information.”  It continues to say that ITSE is “for the purpose of 
information gathering, fraud, or computer system access,” (2009).  This definition doesn’t really 
comment on the technical vs. psychological argument, but it does take a very broad approach 
when explaining the goals.  Under this definition, the con man borrowing people’s watches and 
never returning them constitutes social engineering.   
 Moreover, Ira Winkler, one of the current experts in the field of ITSE wrote the 
following: 
 To the unexposed reader, social engineering (ITSE) is the hacker term for performing 
non-technical attacks.  To most hackers, these attacks are typically pretext telephone calls 
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where the hacker pretends to be someone to dupe an unsuspecting person out of 
information that can get the hacker access to a computer.  Sometimes social engineering 
refers to going into offices and looking around for information about computer systems, 
such as passwords taped to monitors (Winkler 8).   
Winkler clearly shows the confusion present in the definition and shows how different people 
take different sides.  For example, the unexposed reader took a side on the nature of ITSE 
argument, stating that the attack has to be non-technical and not mentioning the specific goals.  
Under this definition, something like e-mail phishing would not count as social engineering as it 
is a technical attack.     
 Matt Bishop mentioned social engineering only once in the textbook he wrote, titled 
Computer Security Art and Science.  He classified social engineering as something not of the 
technical arena.  He stated that “social engineering attacks are remarkably successful and often 
devastating,” (Bishop 21).  Furthermore, Charles and Shari Pfleeger wrote another widely used 
textbook about security called Security in Computing.  They defined social engineering as the 
“easiest attack” and provided the following definition for social engineering:  “Social 
engineering involves using social skills and personal interaction to get someone to reveal 
security-related information and perhaps even to do something that permits an attack.”  They 
went on to say, “The purpose of social engineering is to persuade the victim to be helpful,” 
(Pfleeger 233).  Pfleeger and Pfleeger tried to answer the questions above, but they didn’t really 
take a side on the nature argument, while Bishop agreed with Winkler’s unexposed definition.  
What they did take a side on is the goals argument, stating that social engineering’s only goal is 
persuasion.  Using this definition, an individual lying about all the break-ins he has had to 
convince his neighbor to build a security fence would classify as social engineering.   
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 Hacking Exposed, one of the most recognized consumer hacking books, identified social 
engineering as “a description of techniques using persuasion and / or deception to gain access to 
information systems,” (McClure 623).  This “socio-technical attack,” as it is called in the book, 
generally takes place in human conversation and is “a fusion of basic human trickery and 
sophisticated technical sleight of hand.”  According to Hacking Exposed, social engineering must 
not only be psychological but it must specifically be persuasion or deception.   
 A definition listed on one of the prime penetration testers for social engineering, 
RocketReady, defines ITSE as:  “An attack based on deceiving users or administrators at the 
target site. Attacks are typically carried out by phoning or emailing users and pretending to be an 
authorized user to gain illicit access to systems,” (Rocketready.com 1).  This definition is a little 
more “hands-on,” providing examples and mentioning users and administrators as the target, 
gaining access as the goal and deceiving as the method.   
 As these examples show, literature defines this term in quite a few different ways.  As 
such I have formed my own definition and answered the important questions.  This will be the 
definition that I use throughout this dissertation.   
 My definition for social engineering is as follows:  People are vulnerabilities in the 
common security paradigm, which was discussed in the philosophy of security section above.  
Social engineering is the exploitation of said vulnerability.  Unfortunately, as one of my favorite 
T-shirts states, “There is no patch for human stupidity.”  This T-shirt is an example of how 
people perceive social engineering:  A problem with no solution.  On the argument of the nature 
of social engineering, I take the stance of it being always psychological and sometimes technical.  
For example, a person who calls up someone pretending to be the help desk (a pretexting attack), 
the attack is generally considered non-technical but psychological.  However, the same attack 
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occurring over e-mail is technical and also psychological.  The psychological aspect of social 
engineering is what makes the attack, not the technical.  
 However, to limit the scope of a social engineering attack, I support the fact that the goal 
must be to obtain knowledge or permission to gain access to information technology.  This 
access could arguably be physical, sitting in front of the computer, but if the digital data, 
generally in the form of a computer, is not present and all that was happening was an illegal 
entrance into the room, then social engineering has not occurred.  If I break into your room and 
nothing is in there I have not committed social engineering no matter the method I used to break 
in.  In contrast, if this room contains the control for a computer banking system, then I have used 
social engineering if the method was psychological.   
 
A social engineering attack:  A social engineering attack is an attack that uses social means 
such as deception and manipulation in order to gain access to information technology.  An 
example of this would be an attacker calling up an employee, pretending to be from the IT team 
and convincing them to give up a password.   
 
Pretexting attack:  Pretexting is an attack in which the attacker creates a scenario to try and 
convince the victim to give up valuable information, such as a password.  The most common 
example of a pretexting attack is when someone calls an employee and pretends to be someone 
in power, such as the CEO or on the information technology team.  The attacker convinces the 
victim that the scenario is true and collects information that is sought.   
 
14 
Identity theft:  Identity theft is an attack where the attacker steals a victim's identity in the form 
of a social security number, bank account information, or other personal information.  The 
attacker can use this identity to take out loans, run up medical bills, apply for credit cards, or just 
steal money from the victim.  This is a very hard crime to defend against.  Some states don’t 
even have laws against identity theft, placing the blame on the victim for not keeping their data 
secure (Schmidt 1-9).  Due to this attack’s social nature, pretending to be someone else, I believe 
this fits under the umbrella of social engineering.   
 
Phishing:  Phishing is the process of illegally obtaining information by faking an electronic 
communication, generally by pretending to be something real and legit.  An example of this 
could be an e-mail pretending to be from a bank asking you to change your password.  
Sometimes these e-mails even look like a real e-mail or send you to a Web site that looks 
identical to your bank (Schmidt 41-50).  Information technology professionals debate if phishing 
should be considered part of social engineering.  However, as with identity theft, I think phishing 
fits within my definition of social engineering quite well and would classify phishing as a 
specific attack within social engineering.   
 
Malware:  Malware is software that is put on a victim’s computer, generally without their 
consent.  Malware has many purposes, including identity theft, phishing, or sometimes just 
general information gathering.  For example, an attacker may collect all the Web sites you visit 
to help generate ads which may interest the victim.  This, of course, may be helpful to the 
installer of the software (the victim), but it may also slow down his/her computer.  The main 
difference between this and other software is the person who initiated the install.  When the user 
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initiated it, it’s called “software” and when someone else does it without the user’s knowledge 
it’s called “malware,” (McClure 630-634).  
 
Hack:  A hack is a technical attack performed against a computer or server as opposed to a 
social attack described throughout this paper.  Sometimes information gained in social attacks is  
used during a hack.   
 
Social engineering attacker or hacker:  This is the person who actually manipulates the victim 
through any medium, including e-mails, face-to-face conversations, or via phone calls.  
16 
CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
 Miles Orvell, a professor at Temple University wrote “One indication that a new 
scholarly field is emerging is the appearance of the conferences, journals and books on that 
theme.”  Judging by this criteria, ITSE still has a long way to go.  In this chapter, I will lay out 
some of the work that has been done and highlight some large holes in ITSE research.   
 
Curriculum Research 
Douglas Twitchell of Illinois State University proposed a curriculum to teach social 
engineering attacks and defenses.  In his study he showed that social engineering is only briefly 
mentioned in about 30% of security curriculums and ITSE defenses are never taught (Twitchell 
1). 
 
Agent Based Research 
 Some of the most interesting and newest research into social engineering was first 
proposed by Stephanie White in 2003 and involves an agent based system (White 1-2).  This idea 
of fitting people, or agents, into models is an idea, which is catching on.  This idea ties a process 
or a role to each individual agent or team to produce what Ms. White calls an “artifact” or simply 
a result (White 2).  Argonne National Laboratory recently won a large grant to build an Agent 
Based Modeling and Simulation (ABMS) system to see how people effect complex processes 
such as social engineering (Macal, “Complex Adaptive Systems,” par. 1)  
Raymond Parks worded this well in an IEEE article he published called “Attacking Agent 
Based Systems.”  He stated that  
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 Intelligent, autonomous agents sense and react to their environment, learning from 
the effect that their own actions have on their environment.  The more intelligent the 
agent, the more it is like a human mind, which means that agents inherit the weakness of 
human minds – gullibility.  If the relatively new field of attacking computer security can 
be said to have a tradition, a major element of that tradition is the art of “social 
engineering”, the action of influencing a human, or in this case, an agent to perform some 
function helpful to the attacker.   Social engineering is the old con game with a new 
purpose.  Agents operate according to algorithms and internal logic specific to their 
functions and can be social engineered just like human beings.  Agent social engineering 
is limited by the range of senses and responses within the target agent.  The attacker must 
present the agent with a sensed environment that will cause a response favorable for the 
attacker (Parks 2).  
Agent based modeling provides a great method to study social engineering in a controlled 
atmosphere.  Its current focus is only on attacks so it lacks the ability to develop defense 
mechanisms, except through the modeling of attacks.  There is some potential with this thought 
process, but I don’t see the logic in limiting the field to attacks only at this point.   
 
History 
              There has also been a minor amount of research done concerning the history and 
evolution of social engineering.  In 2004, Tim Thornburgh from Kennesaw State University 
discussed a little bit about what has changed throughout time involving social engineering.  He 
traced this idea of manipulation through the dark ages into today explaining how it is in our 
nature to persuade and manipulate.  He provided a lot of very interesting examples such as the 
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famous Trojan Horse story.  Thornburgh introduced four stages of social engineering:  research, 
developing rapport and trust, exploiting trust and utilizing information (Thornburgh 1-4).   
 
Trust Model 
               These four stages are not a new concept and bring me to the next large area of research 
that has been performed regarding social engineering:  the Trust Model.   
               The trust model as seen above lays out the groundwork to show how people develop 
trust relationships other people.  This model shows all the ties which tie people together into trust 
circles (Laribee 2).    
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Some authors have even taken this trust model and even built an attack model on the top of it 
(Laribee 2).  Moreover, quite a few authors have taken these trust models and built defenses on 
top of it including privacy regulations and rules (Orgill 2). 
 
Missing Pieces 
              And thats about it.  All of the research I could locate about social engineering could be 
classified into those areas mentioned above.  The most developed area is the trust model, 
containing practical reaches into the attack and defense arenas.  However, I don’t hold much 
promise to there being a solution to the problem of ITSE by studying the trust relationships of 
people.  This approach is very limiting and depends on the idea that every attack is an attack 
based on trust and the manipulation of the trust.  Besides, as Tim Thornburgh mentioned earlier, 
people can never stop trusting others; it’s too much part of our human nature.   
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                I think a promising area is the agent based modeling.  This model has a lot of unique 
ideas, potential, and benefits that will benefit social engineering research quite dramatically.  As 
mentioned above, this has the ability to change and grow, and I believe it will be where the big 
breakthroughs happen involving behavior management.   
               As you can see, there isn’t much existing core research about social engineering.  Some 
of the most basic research involving the historical study to even the specific questions regarding 
social engineering’s use today have not yet seen a considerable amount of work.  However, as 
you can see from the sources, most of this research has happened in the last 10 years, and I 
expect to see a continued growth.  
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CHAPTER 4:  CONCEPTUAL MODELS 
Introduction 
This section explores the prevalent concepts in social engineering attacks.  These 
concepts help answer two questions about social engineering attacks:  What exactly happens 
during an attack, and why are these attacks possible?  Exploring these questions to determine the 
anatomy of an attack will help develop strategies to defend against these attacks. 
The first concept that seems to arise when thinking about social engineering focuses on 
psychology.  Psychology should be able to explain why people can be social engineered into 
giving up sensitive data.  Accordingly, quite a bit of research has been done in regards to 
psychological persuasion, but, surprisingly, only one behavior concept has been applied directly 
to social engineering: neuro-linguistic programming.  The following section explores how neuro-
linguistic programming and other psychological principals apply to social engineering.  This 
section includes summaries of research that has already been completed and some new thoughts 
and research directions.   
 While social engineering in the context of technology is a relatively new phenomenon, 
the idea of manipulation of a communication network is not a new idea and has quite a history 
behind it.  In order to understand this problem, the second part of this chapter will take a step 
back beyond the common perceptions of the time and analyze manipulation in the context of one 
of the most famous large scale manipulations of all time — the Nazi Party manipulating the 
German people.  By exploring the relationship between the individual and the Nazi state, I will 
draw parallels between the way the Nazis manipulated the German people into genocide and 
today’s how nefarious characters — hackers — manipulate seemingly innocent people in the 
networked information technology world.   
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Psychology 
Applying psychology, especially neuro-linguistic programming, to social engineering is 
not a long stretch by any means.  People use language to influence each other, and social 
engineering is generally seen as tricking people into giving up passwords or giving up access.  
However, social engineering is really the same act as any other act of influence.  People do many 
things to influence and “social engineer” people on a day-to-day basis.  This could include lying 
to your boss when you’re 5 minutes late for work, or saying you ate Chinese yesterday just 
because you don’t feel like eating it for lunch today.  People naturally lie and manipulate others 
for their own gain and language is the tool we use for this.  If I want to communicate my 
thoughts to you and manipulate you, I have to use language either via conversation, e-mail, or on 
the telephone.   
An interesting way to look at language is to think of it as a computer program.  Language 
as a program or as a “thing” has one main purpose of communication.  The words you hear are 
the inputs to language and the stream of thought is what comes out or vice versa.  Either I listen 
to what you are saying and attempt to visualize it, or I try to put into words what I am 
visualizing.   
More specifically, language has three main functions:  deletion, distortion, and 
generalization (Stanojevic 5).  Deletion removes unneeded information from your thoughts to 
simplify the transition into words.  For example, while I type this paper, I might say “I am 
writing a paper.”  What you are missing is everything else, such as that my body is noticing the 
room is hot, I have a candle lit, and I am on a Macintosh laptop.  All this extra information is 
deleted.  Distortion effects what exactly I am doing or what is actually happening.  For example 
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the same sentence above stated, “I am writing a paper;” however, I am actually typing the paper.  
The actual term was slightly distorted to help the listener understand the sentence.  I like to call 
this the “dummifier.”  Generalization takes what you are doing and generalizes it.  For example 
in, “I am writing a paper,” I am actually typing the letter “I” now followed by the letter “space,” 
etc.  Language generalizes what I am doing (Stanojevic 1-43).   
According to Stanojevic, there are two major models used to analyze language, the Meta 
Model and the Milton Model.  The Meta Model is what the brain uses to try to decipher and 
reconnect the meaning behind the words.  This model tries to reverse the damage language does 
to the specificity of messages; it tries to reverse deletion, distortion, and generalization.  For 
example a simple example is if I say, “The car drives to the store.”  The Meta Model tries to 
reassemble this language into something you can understand, even though all the information is 
missing.  What color of car?  What kind of car?  Did it go fast or slow?  What store did it go to?  
All these pieces are not part of the sentence but you can still picture the message based on your 
experiences.  This is very useful when trying to understand someone.  The more you know 
someone, the more you can decipher using body language and what experiences you have in 
common to determine meaning.  For instance if you and the speaker both drive a red car, there is 
a good chance you will be visualizing the same red car (Stanojevic 1-43).   
In the context of social engineering, The Meta Model is usable only in data collection or 
recon.  If an attacker it trying to find out information about you and you suddenly tense up when 
he states, “The car drives to the store,” at the very least that statement struck a nerve with you.    
Maybe you forgot something at the store today or maybe you had a loved one die on their way to 
the store.  However, this model cannot be used to manipulate someone as it is only a data 
collector.   
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 To examine the influence on the individual, we need to look at the other model, the 
Milton model introduced by Milton Erickson.  He is regarded as one of the world’s greatest 
hypnotists, and he noticed that the hardest way to convince someone of something was when you 
disagreed with what they thought (with the implication that you are smarter than they are).  He 
came up with the idea that in order to influence people you need to convince them that they came 
up with the idea themselves and that they have been smarter than you all along.  An attacker 
should make sure no one ever disagrees with him.  The most common way to do this, as 
suggested by Erickson, is to lead victims through the argument using very big generalizations.   
For example, let’s say the attacker and the victim disagree on the color of the ceiling tile.  The 
attacker believes the tile is white, and the victim thinks the tile is gray.  But, both will agree with 
statements such as “The tile is a color.”  An attacker, cyber or otherwise, would use these 
generalizations to help persuade and influence people to do what is wanted (Bandler 24-35).   
 Another key thing Erickson noticed was the lack of negation in our mind. In fact, the idea 
of negation really doesn’t exist except in language.  If I say the car is not driving to the store.  
How do you visualize that?  You can only visualize the action then wipe it away.  Yet another of 
Erickson’s key ideas is the idea of tag words.  If I say, “you will go to the store, won’t you?”  or 
“I am tall as a sign, aren’t I?”  That ending negation coupled with the earlier positive in the 
sentence confuses the mind.  In a lot of ways this confusion is similar to a computer becoming 
overloaded because the mind has limitations on memory in the same way that a computer does.   
For example, a study done by Mike Murray in 2004 showed that you are four times more 
likely to do what I command you to do if I preceded the command with a seemingly non-
grammatical or complex sentence, than if I use a grammatically correct or simple sentence.  This 
goes something like this: “Do you realize that you’re not thinking right now of what I am not 
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saying?  And can you realize that it’s not that easy to not know what I am going to say next, but 
even when you’re not knowing it I am knowing it and you’re not?”  When faced with a similar 
message, a brain just shuts down.  It’s very much like a buffer overflow.  Anything done to 
overwhelm the brain creates an opportunity for influence (Murray par. 45-100).   
But, what is it overflowing into?  When a hacker uses a buffer overflow attack against a 
computer system, they overload a variable with so much data that they start to write into system 
memory, allowing them to do as they please.  A person’s mind doesn’t have this type of system 
memory, but similarities can be seen in the idea of consciousness vs. unconsciousness in the 
human mind.  People have a fairly small conscious mind and a very large unconscious mind, but 
most people don’t realize all that their unconscious mind is doing.  It is making the heart beat, 
controlling breathing, and monitoring nerve reaction, etc.  The unconscious mind alerts the 
conscious mind using the critical faculty, which is the barrier between these two parts of the 
mind (Murray par. 45-55).   
 An interesting study about this overflowing idea examined two groups of college 
students.  Both had to listen to a lecture on “why fraternities were evil.”  One listened via lecture 
only and were given a test over the topic.  The other group listening to the same lecture but with 
a TV on.  The second group was 50% more likely to be swayed by the arguments according to 
the test.  It is interesting to see that the second group, which was clearly more distracted due to 
the television being on seemed to absorb the information more thoroughly.  Not only did they 
absorb it, but they were persuaded by it (Murray par. 66-67).   
 Using buffer overflows to affect the mind works well.  Another manipulation trick taken 
right out of the computer hacking textbook is “fork bombs.”  A fork bomb is a program or script 
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that opens an exponentially growing amount of processes on a system by duplicating itself.  For 
example, a simple fork bomb on a Windows computer looks like this: 
 
:c 
start %0 
goto c 
 
:c is the name of the program, start %0 starts a copy of itself, and goto c returns to the top.  So 
the first time this program runs, it creates a copy of itself and starts over, then two programs 
make copies of themselves, then four, then eight, 16, 32, 64, and so on.    
 The same process can be done on the mind.  Tell a story.  Don’t finish.  Tell another 
story, don’t finish.  Tell another story.  Repeat.  This cyclical pattern is actually used quite a bit 
during political speeches.  Politicians talk about taxes, immigration, foreign policy, etc.  They 
don’t finish each idea until much later and this style almost makes it appear boring to the listener.  
That “zoning out” is what allows the speech giver, or attacker if that’s the case, to put real 
information directly into the listener’s unconscious mind (Bandler 24-35).   
 All these manipulation tools almost seem like back doors into the human mind, but the 
biggest tool is part of the language program we discussed earlier.  In order to listen to a sentence 
we have to visualize it (Bandler 24-35).    In the above example, negation was used in the 
statement, “The car did not go to the store.”  In order to process that language one has to 
translate the words into the images in the mind then erase those images.  However, the mind has 
already generated the images.  Negation allows an attacker to control what a person is visualizing 
if only for an instant.  The same process works with questions, if an attacker asks the question, 
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“Can you imagine what it would be like to give me your password?”  The victim has now 
thought about giving the attacker his/her password.  By reading this you have given me control—
to some extent—of your mind because the question introduced an idea or a concept into your 
consciousness.  At this point, in the case of cyber attacks, the attacker has the victim confused 
and visualizing the act.  The attacker now has some form of influence over the victim, which 
may be all the attacker needs to make someone act on that influence.   
People generally will not act against what they believe.  There is a built in set of morals 
people develop over the years and these morals are very difficult to break.  However, the field of 
psychology has defined a way around this, called framing.  Framing, or priming, states that if one 
is put in the right context, he or she will do things inconsistent with established values.  Context 
is more important than content.   
 Milton Erickson experimented with this idea of framing.  He was a military hypnotist and 
was in charge of finding a way to get a subordinate to kill his commanding officer.  The military 
trains people to follow orders and respect the chain of command very well.  Simple hypnosis 
would not even come close to working because the officers truly believed they shouldn't kill.  
The training had instilled within them morals that told them, “Do not kill your commanding 
officer.”  However, put the same message of killing an officer in the right frame and things 
change completely.  If the commanding officer is said to be a traitor suddenly getting someone to 
go against his or her values becomes possible (Erickson 70-76).   
 How does an attacker put people in the right frame of mind?  Robert Cialdini identified 
three frames that would be very useful to an attacker.   
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• Reciprocation.  When someone does something for a person, her or she wants to do 
something back.  This is how timeshares sale pitches work.  Timeshares give people 
enough free stuff, such as a free night stay or a free meal, and you want to give something 
back to them and purchase a timeshare.  People are generally nice, and so it is said that 
the best way to seal a friendship is to ask a favor of that friend.  Receiving a favor is 
stronger for a relationship then doing a favor.  In the case of social engineering, the 
attacker might do a favor for the victim to entice the victim into reciprocating (Cialdini 
76-82).   
 
• Social proof.  You walk down the street and see two restaurants.  One is completely 
empty and one is packed with lines out the door.  Generally, people decide to go to the 
busier restaurant.  People trust what everyone else thinks, even though they may have just 
been following what the people before them thought.  In the case of cyber attacker, an 
attacker just needs to convince the victim that everyone else is doing whatever the 
attacker is (Cialdini 76-82).   
 
• Authority.  People generally do what those in authority tell people to do.  In social 
engineering, an attacker might try to establish authority over others by pretending to be 
the boss or part of the IT team (Cialdini 76-82).   
 
Put people in the right frame, ask the right questions, and the chance of succeeding is greatly 
increased. 
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Neuro-linguistic Programming 
I remember the first conference I attended, The Computer Security Institute’s NetSec in 
2005.  There was a course titled “Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP)” and had the description 
as follows:   
Advertisers use it, many Federal agencies teach it to their operatives, and psychologists 
use it to gain patient trust, now you can learn these valuable social engineering skills. 
These secret concepts are rarely taught outside of a closed circle practitioners. Used 
properly, these skills will help you gain the trust and confidence of anyone, from your 
children, to helping your staff comply with security rules. This How-To session gives you 
a model for impactful communications and skills in influencing a subject's experiences. 
Learn 3 key power moments in conversations, understand the concept of and state 4 ways 
of making people feel at ease, in any situation. Learners will be able to practice these 
skills during this session, so mastery comes easier in the "real world." Articles, on-line 
references and a checklist make this session valuable for anyone who needs to gain the 
trust of others. Someone could be using these on you right now!  (Smith 1). 
Ever since reading this description, the concept of NLP has intrigued me very much.  I attended 
the conference session and have talked with Brad Smith quite a bit since then.   
 Neuro-linguistic programming is "a model of interpersonal communication chiefly 
concerned with the relationship between successful patterns of behavior and the subjective 
experiences (esp. patterns of thought) underlying them" and "a system of alternative therapy 
based on this which seeks to educate people in self-awareness and effective communication, and 
to change their patterns of mental and emotional behavior" (Grinder).  Brad Smith took this idea 
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and applied a social engineering framework to it to help explain the anatomy of a social 
engineering attack.   
 Specifically, NLP takes the concepts from counseling and psychology and applies those 
behaviors to explain how people manipulate others into giving up information or how people 
give information without knowing it, similar to covert channels.  For example, when an attacker 
is trying to convince someone to give up a password using a pretexting attack, it may sound 
something similar to this:   
 
Victim:  Hello.  How may I help you today? 
Attacker:  Hello.  I am from the IT Department.  What is your password?   
 
Generally, something like this doesn’t work or shouldn’t work.  However, in a study performed 
in 2008 in London, 80% of people would give up their passwords with a simple question like this 
and a bribe of 5 Euros (Egan,”20 Idiots Give Up Password for £5 Mark & Spencer Department 
Store Voucher,” par. 1). 
 However, let us assume that most companies train their employees to have some common 
sense and at least adhere to the most common security principle:  “Trust no one until they prove 
it” or as Ronald Reagan would say, “trust but verify.”  Someone looking to employ the use of 
NLP usually will do so with a little more finesse and manipulation than simply asking for 
information.   
 Indeed, the psychology behind counseling and behavior manipulation involves 
persuasion.  Our brain listens to the words of persuasion but our unconscious hears the gestures, 
voice tone, speed, pitch, and eyebrow movement.  This non-verbal communication is how people 
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can read various connotations in the language and how two identical sentences can have very 
different meanings.  People tend to look for these clues and use them to interpret messages.  
These non-verbal cues let the victims trust their “gut” and allows an attacker to manipulate that 
trust in our ability to interpret statements.  Let us add some style, voice tone, speed, and pitch to 
the cyber attack above and see how it sounds.   
 
Victim:  Hello.  How may I help you today? 
Attacker:  Hello.  My name is Adam.  (Pause) I am from the (raise voice for next 2 words) IT 
department upstairs, and I was wondering if you would please (pause) help me and tell me your 
password?  
 That sentence feels and sounds much more believable.  A key point in NLP manipulation 
is that one cannot make someone else change—that’s his or her decision.  If the target did not 
want to give up their password, you would not be able to make them change their mind.  People 
generally act in their own best interest, for their own reasons and are always looking for 
“WIIFM” or “What’s in it for me?”  Consequently, to be successful a cyber attacker’s offer 
needs to be specific and attractive to the individual.  An attacker must show that this request 
meets a need, both a need for the attacker and the person being attacked.  This motivation could 
be many things from a desire to succeed, to making a difference, or even just being remembered.   
 The cyber attacked process suggested in NLP counseling by Mike Murray is as follows:   
1) Ask them what you would like them to do or what you recommend.   
2) Give them a reason and use the word “because.”   
3) Sincerely ask for help.  
4) Give them a chance to say “yes.”  
32 
(Murray,”The Science of Social Engineering” par. 3-5) 
Now, let us add some motivation to the attack mentioned above and see what it looks like:   
 
Victim:  Hello.  How may I help you today? 
Attacker:  Hello.  My name is Adam.  (Pause.) I am from the IT department upstairs, and I was 
wondering if you would please help me.  I was recently changing passwords and I accidentally 
changed yours.  I am so sorry for this inconvenience.  Can I please have your old password so I 
can change it back because I really don’t want to cause you any hassle? 
 
This attack is much more persuasive than the original attack or even the second version because 
it includes motivation.   
NLP also includes the concept of “power moments” and “power words.”  Power 
moments are moments that are the best time to act, and include three main moments:  “Thank 
You,” “Yes,” and “No.”  The first two seem pretty obvious:   
“Thank you for working late on Friday.”   
“You’re welcome. How about that raise?” 
However, “no” requires a little more explanation.  But, remember that power moments are 
moments that offer an opening or an opportunity.   
“No.” 
“How about you tell me how long your password is then?” 
Another key concept in NLP is the idea of power words, which are words that have hidden 
influence on people.  These words are have used by politicians, advertisers, and salespeople for 
years to manipulate people and crowds.  Power words include things such as sale, free, bonus, 
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select, unique, limited, secret, secure, family, safe, and love.  For example, an attacker may send 
you a phishing e-mail talking saying “CLICK HERE FOR A LIMITED TIME SALE!” or the 
infamous “I Love you” e-mails popular a few years ago.  It even works cross culturally assuming 
good translation (Smith 2003). 
 
Process 
Originally, NLP was created by John Grinder and Richard Bandler as a model of how 
communication impacts and is impacted by subjective experiences (Smith 4).  The theory was 
developed to help people, and four simple steps were created:   
1)  Speak to others with direction (power words).  
Make sure statements are descriptive, use all senses, and the engage memory recall.  For example 
instead of saying, “I ate chocolate today” say, “I had chocolate today that was melting in my 
fingers.  I couldn’t help but smack my lips from the pure chocolate smell.” 
2)  Make yourself believable (facials).  
One should do some motion whenever he or she wants others to remember something.  For 
example, someone could raise their eyebrows while saying your name.  This is a subconscious, 
micro-motor way to get recognized in others’ minds.   
3)  Speak like those you are speaking with. 
Match speaking partners’ pitch, speed, and word choice because “birds of a feather flock 
together.”   
4)  Sit like those you are speaking with. 
Match conversation partners’ body language. 
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Conclusion  
 NLP provides many principles, which when combined with the psychological principles 
above, allow for numerous access points into a person’s mind, and, thus, access for social 
engineering.  This section has hopefully tackled some of the many “hows” when talking about 
social engineering.  
 
IT Networks and Nazism:  Unwitting participation 
In 1969, ARPAnet—the original Internet—was created and computers were 
interconnected effectively for the first time. The Michigan Terminal System and many other 
systems tried similar less effective things long before.  While many of the details of how 
computers communicate with each other have been worked out, such as security mechanisms and 
a variety of protocols, the idea of how people fit into the computer communication network still 
is a fairly new idea.   
 One new method to think about how computers communicate with each other and how 
people fit in is the most basic model of computer communication, the OSI Model.  The OSI 
Model, developed in 1977, consists of seven layers that describe how computers communicate 
with each other.  These layers include the following (in order from top to bottom):  application, 
presentation, session, transport, network, data link, and physical.  Recently, the idea of people or 
“the user” has been added to the top of the OSI model, creating eight layers.   
Placing “user” at the top layer of the model makes a lot of sense, and doing so will draw 
some interesting comparisons.  The OSI model was built to help people understand that each 
layer can only actually communicate with the layer above or below it; however, a layer can 
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virtually communicate with itself on another machine.  The best way to describe this concept is 
with an example.   
If a machine is communicating using an IP address, it would be found on the network 
layer.  To communicate with another machine it would need that machine’s IP address, and it 
would look as if traffic was going from one IP address to another.  However, quite a bit more is 
actually going on in this simple example.  The IP address is translated to the layer below (the 
data link layer) where it becomes a mac address, and it then is transformed to the physical 1’s 
and 0’s, which are transferred across the actual wire to the destination machine.  That machine 
then receives this data via the 1’s and 0’s, which it translates up to a mac address and eventually 
back to an IP address.   
This same type of process holds true for the user layer.  When a user uses a computer to 
send an e-mail, as far as the user is concerned, they are communicating directly with the person 
they are sending an e-mail to.  However, this e-mail is actually being communicated down all the 
layers, across the wire as 1’s and 0’s, and back up through all the layers to the receiving user.  To 
the user, all this translation is transparent:  The only translation a user understands is that an e-
mail address translates to a person.  Many people view the Internet just like they view the 
transmission in their car.  It works and they don’t care how or why.  However, a car 
transmission, unlike the Internet, cannot be used directly for malicious purposes to cause 
someone else to lose money or steal information. 
 Hackers try to manipulate a communication network to gain access to data and systems 
they should not have access to.  The idea of using social means to manipulate an individual into 
unknowingly giving up sensitive data is known in information technology circles as social 
engineering.  This effort to manipulate a communication network is, surprisingly, not a new idea 
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and has quite a history behind it.  In order to understand this problem, I will take a step back out 
of the common perceptions of the time and analyze manipulation by one of the most famous 
large scale manipulations of all time—The Nazi Party manipulating the German people.  By 
exploring the relationship between the individual and the Nazi state, I will to be able to draw 
parallels between the way the Nazis manipulated the German people into genocide and the way 
nefarious actors—hackers—manipulate seemingly innocent people in the networked information 
technology world.   
 
The Nazi State 
Historian Kevin Amidon defined the Nazi state as a system for the “generation of 
complicity” (Amidon 103-37).  The Nazi leadership set up everything in society, such as 
industry, education, and politics, in ways that set groups against one another in competition to 
look like the best Nazis.  Below you will find details about the ways in which the Nazi state as a 
whole generated complicity.  Hitler was at the center of this system and to some extent generated 
complicity, but he wasn’t alone.  He, along with a group of other Nazis leaders around him, 
worked the system of complicity out ad-hoc (similar to how a wireless network is set up).  To 
manipulate the German people, the Nazis used a few key techniques, which have much similarity 
to networked information technology systems.   
 
Technique 1:  Bring a whole bunch of smart people trying to gain prestige and to be 
productive in the system and use their ambitions and talents to strengthen the totalitarian system 
(put everyone in its service).  To do this the Nazi system had to embrace technology and 
encourage the growth of technology.   
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 Gottfried Feder, an engineer who designed a concrete ship at the end of WWI (a notable 
though not economically viable achievement), stated that technology was bound to the soil and 
the nation (Peukert 94).  This idea of connecting technology to the Nazi ideals served to help 
motivate intelligent people to participate in this generation of complicity. These scientists and 
engineers participated in this system in order to become successful.  The Nazi system 
encouraged these intelligent people to help design the system, but in order to do so they needed 
to progress deeper into the system of inclusion and exclusion.  This set up a competition, in 
which scientists competed with other scientists to not only come up with the newest and greatest 
ideas but also to include and exclude the right races.  Even Fritz Todt, a leader in the design of 
the Autobahn system, got in on the action and sketched a plan, which Hitler supported, to put 
industry and technology in a central role of Nazi society (Peukert 94).  However for all his 
support of Hitler, Todt was killed in a plane crash in suspicious circumstances in 1943 after he 
started to doubt that Germany could win the war. 
 The same drive for productivity can be found on networked information technology 
systems.  This drive is what originally started the big dot com bubble that saw online companies 
for everything from diapers to T-shirts pop up.  The desire for productivity forced people to 
either modernize and industrialize or be left behind.  With the reduced cost of shipping, suddenly 
a world of cheap labor opened up and companies began to globalize and outsource production.  
This idea, as referred to by Thomas Friedman, is called the “flattening of the world.”  This 
“flattening” of the world has put the Internet, a network of computers, central in the lives of 
many, much like the Nazi system put this idea of inclusion and exclusion central to the lives of 
everyone involved (Friedman).   
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Technique 2:  Pick specific people to exclude (communists and Jewish people in 
particular) as being nefarious or, as the Nazi’s put it, “unworthy” or “impure.”  This strategy 
created a constant sense that something—or someone—was endangering the system.  As a result, 
all who wanted to participate in the Nazi culture had to also be involved in the process of 
excluding the “bad guys.”  And so this new world of inclusion and exclusion drove everyone 
who wanted to participate into even greater levels of participation until complicity stopped being 
simply going along and became actually perpetrating crimes or what we might even call evil.   
 In a culture like the Nazi culture, an individual derived his sense of having a place in the 
world only from his belonging to a movement or his membership in the party (Arendt 323).  
Hannah Arendt called this movement a “classless society.”  Indeed, totalitarian movements like 
the Nazi movement are mass organizations of atomized, isolated individuals, rather than a 
collection of groups.  Compared with all other parties and movements, totalitarian movements’ 
most conspicuous external characteristic is their demand for total, unrestricted, unconditional, 
and unalterable loyalty of the individual member (Arendt 323).  Totalitarianism, as defined by 
the Nazi culture, was best described by Hannahh Arendt as “...a form of government together 
with its accompanying ideology.” 
On the Internet, with the invention and popularity of forums and blogs designed so 
individual users can share their thoughts, people have created a “classless society” where “every 
word is created equal.”  This idea can easily be taken a step further to the current political debate 
about the Internet—the concept of net neutrality.  Net neutrality states that every packet is 
created equal as it travels across the Internet.  This can be a good thing in the sense that 
everything is given equal rights and everyone and anyone can share information.  However, this 
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can also be a bad thing because everything, even nefarious packets, can be transmitted equally 
across the Internet.   
 Another concept Hannah Arendt touched on was the “banality of evil.”  Evil happens 
because someone like Adolf Eichman focused on rubber stamping papers rather than the larger 
implications of orders on the papers he was stamping.  As a result, it didn’t matter if those papers 
were railroad car tickets or orders for the deportation of 400,000 Jews from Budapest to the gas 
chambers.  The focus was on the paper and the focus on the banal bits of activity.  Getting your 
work done and not thinking about the broader picture creates a causal link between the banal 
focus on minor bureaucratic activity and destructive consequences resulting from that 
bureaucratic activity (Arendt 300-400).   
 This type of tunnel vision is also a concern in information technology.  The function of 
the system in IT networks is not transparent to the people who work on them, and in many cases 
people desire not to know about how the structure functions, a common feeling for most who use 
all types of technology.  But users not knowing how IT networks function may be a danger.  
Hackers can use IT networks to steal passwords, credit card numbers, and a variety of other 
private data by gaining access to even one system.  For example, most people couldn’t care less 
how the transmission works in your car but just cause you don’t know how it works doesn’t 
mean it can be “caused” by someone else to murder someone or cause a million credit numbers 
to be released to criminals.   
 In less than one hour, an unpatched computer system running the Windows operating 
system placed on the Internet will be taken over by numerous programs.  These programs may be 
simple spyware, which inform some company of your browsing habits, or simple malware, 
which allow a hacker to use your system to attack other networked systems.  When the innocent 
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individual who owns the computer is tried for this crime, they generally try to defend it by 
denying that they knew what they were doing.  This idea of causing others to do the evil work 
because of their naivety is a common connection that can be made and a common defense used 
during the Nazi Nuremburg trials (Grodin 40).   
 
Technique 3:  Use propaganda to scare people into participation.  According to Hannah 
Arendt, “the masses have to be won by propaganda” (Arendt 341).  Propaganda is rampant 
across the Internet in the form of ads.  It is hard to travel around the Web without seeing some 
advertisement for something somewhere.  Generally these advertisements try to scare you into 
checking your computer’s security settings and purchasing some software.   
 In some ways, these ads, which try to convince you that your computer is infected, or the 
spyware around the Internet, which acts like a scanner saying you have a virus (Windows 
AntiVirus 2008), constitute terror.  The bad guys are trying to convince you that something is 
wrong and you need to secure your system by purchasing this product.  In a lot of ways the same 
can be said for some legitimate business practices.  For example, the idea of a virus scanner is a 
necessity for most people with a Windows computer across the Internet.  However, these are also 
sold for Linux and Macintosh systems, both of which would constitute an even low risk of 
getting a virus.  The companies scare the customers into purchasing the product in the same way 
that hackers do it for their own profit.   
 “Terror continues to be used by totalitarian regimes even after its psychological aims are 
already achieved:  Terror’s real horror is that it reigns over a completely subdued population” 
(Arendt 343).    “Where the rule of terror is brought to perfection, as in the Nazi concentration 
camps, propaganda disappears entirely.  Propaganda, in other words, is one, and possibly the 
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most important, instrument of totalitarianism for dealing with the non-totalitarian world; terror, 
on the contrary, is the essence of its form of government” (Arendt 344).  The Nazi use of terror 
in the working-class districts and the continuous pressure to conform combined to generate a 
ubiquitous sense of persecution and insecurity (Peukert 105).   
 
Living in the Nazi State 
Life in the Nazi culture meant living the concepts of conformity, opposition to 
conformity, and racism every day.  As a result, a distinct line was drawn between insiders and 
outsiders and this distinction affected everyone.  The common people in the Nazi state were 
divided into two groups, the white collar workers and the blue collar workers.  The white collar 
workers were more of the managers and business leaders running the factories and companies 
across Germany.  They had lost the most over the past years of economic depression and wanted 
the most change and success within the new structure:  “White collar workers were attracted less 
by the craft work and ‘blood and soil’ romanticism then by the modern aspects of the National 
Socialist ideology and propaganda” (Peukert 94).   
In this same way, people are attracted to the Internet due to its “flattening effect” on the 
world.  People can now communicate with people across the world via text, audio, or video at the 
speed of light.   
 During the Nazi reign, blue-collar workers were less drawn to this ideal of success and 
productivity.  The blue-collar workers’ attitude of non-compliance during the Third Reich, was 
summed up by Detlev Peukert in his book, Inside Nazi Germany.  The lack of enthusiasm for the 
character and politics of the regime and the lack of zeal in the workplace went along with a wary 
retreat into privacy and into the atmosphere of solidarity in small, intimate groups within the 
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working-class social environment (Peukert 110).  This allowed the populations that actively 
participated to be the ones who were seen and heard and quieted opposition.  This is similar to 
online usage where people who are most active are the ones heard and respected.  The most 
frequently updated blog or Facebook page comes to the forefront more often as opposed to the 
solitary individual quietly writing to himself.   
 This brings up the idea of how outsiders were viewed in the Nazi structure and in the IT 
network structure.  Towards aliens, or immigrants from outside of the German borders, the most 
common attitude of the Nazi people was indifference tempered by occasional sympathy (Peukert 
142).  This is similar to how we view aliens online now because we are often indifferent as to 
which country you are from. Everyone’s ideas are equal and have the possibility for equal say if 
enough people are listening; however people generally only subscribe to forums and blogs that 
fit into what they want to read about and listen to.    
 The only way for the Nazis to make up for lack of substance in the Volksgemeinschaft 
idea, or the people’s community, was to produce passive loyalty (Peukert 188), which they did 
through this idea of complicity.  In order to succeed and do well, Germans had to not only do 
well, but also participate, at growing levels, in the process of inclusion and exclusion.   
 The belief that social problems could be finally and scientifically solved by a joint 
application of educational and social reforms and measures of racial hygiene and improvement 
of the hereditary stock was especially widely canvassed in the popular scientific literature and 
was by no means restricted to extreme right-wing circles (Peukert  222). 
 Many Germans who supported the Nazi Regime, or at least accepted it, believed the 
“Führer” when he promised the he would deliver them from the “abnormal” conditions that had 
been brought about by the upheavals of modernization and the hardships of the depression.  
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Germans were looking for a return to normality, to regular work, to secure planning of their 
lives, and certainty of their own place in the social scheme.  In face of this basic, long-lost sense 
of private well-being, various other warning signs were thrust to one side, virtually excluded 
from everyday awareness:  employment was serving the cause of war-readiness and terror 
against “community aliens” was continuing, and becoming more and more radicalized, not 
scaled down.  People didn’t talk about these things.  But they dreamed about them at night.  
Their dreams betrayed the oppressive presence of anxieties which were all too willingly denied 
in the light of day (Peukert 236). 
 The ranks of the Nazi movement were swollen with a large number of groups and 
individuals from all areas of society from the lowest class to the white-collar class, all whom had 
lives that were shattered from the economic and social dislocations of the Great Depression 
(Peukert 36).  Indeed, “In the end what the Nazis achieved was not a new case of Germany but 
the validation of new social roles.  Those social roles created expectations and assumptions” 
(Evans 98).  Nazism was, in its most simplest form, a set of possibilities for the participation in 
the state’s function, or being complicit in the state or becoming part of that state as a whole 
(similar to the world of a Borg in Star Trek). 
 People became part of troublesome and ever destructive social activities even if they 
themselves have no conscious desire to participate in destructive activity.  Their own narrow 
sphere of work did not contain the broad picture so they did not see the broad picture. 
 
IT Networks  
Social engineering in information technology networks is an investigation of 
phenomenon whereby people are manipulated without their consent into assisting unwittingly in 
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security breaches in the networked information technology world.  Similarly, in German Nazi 
totalitarianism, people were manipulated without their consent to participate in a system of 
government, a system of the operation and management of society that is destructive. 
 Several key points of similarity exist between the lifestyle of an individual within the 
Nazi regime—along the Nazi form of manipulation—and information technology networks.  
Employees of IT networks often do not understand how the Internet or the network works; they 
just know how to do their assigned job.  For example, a secretary at her desk enters data into a 
database, such as names, addresses, and telephone numbers for a donation.  This data is then 
used by people across the world to generate letters to individuals.  The secretary doesn’t know 
how this works and might not even know what this data is for.  Another example would be basic 
typing.  People can easily pick up typing even when there is no familiar alphabetical order to the 
keyboard layout, remember the skill, and type without thinking.  This idea of focusing on the 
banal bits of data was mentioned above when discussing the “banality of evil” and it is related to 
the Nazi manipulation.  Information, false or real, travels much faster now.  Information posted 
on the Internet can be viewed by anyone across the world.   
 In reality no code, computer, or program can be ever be completely trusted.  Ken 
Thompson wrote an interesting article called “Reflections on Trusting Trust.”  In this short 
paper, Thompson talked about how you can’t actually prove anything with a computer, program, 
or code because everything from the compilers to the code on the chip itself can be tampered 
with (761-763).  So there is an explosive situation brewing with cyber attack. On the one hand, 
the press, television, and movies make heroes of vandals by calling them whiz kids. On the other 
hand, the acts performed by these “whiz kids” will soon be punishable by years in prison.  Ira 
Winkler stated, “I have watched kids testifying before Congress. It is clear that they are 
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completely unaware of the seriousness of their acts. There is obviously a cultural gap. The act of 
breaking into a computer system has to have the same social stigma as breaking into a neighbor's 
house. It should not matter that the neighbor's door is unlocked. The press must learn that 
misguided use of a computer is no more amazing than drunk driving of an automobile” (Winkler 
33).     
 
Conclusion 
This section touched on the problem of the complicity in a bureaucratic system 
represented by Nazism.  The Nazi system manipulated individuals who became complicit in its 
destructive activity.  An easy parallel can be drawn with how individuals work in and on 
networked IT systems share aspects of these problems.  They focus on narrow aspects of the 
work and do not see the big picture, they are not even interested, or they are vigorously 
disinterested in asking why the whole system works at all.  Therefore, if the system comes under 
the control or can be manipulated by those who seek the destructive ends, the work of the 
bureaucratic individuals can become part of the process of the perpetration of the attacks.   
 So in the end, the fact that people themselves exist at large scale in non-transparent IT 
networks cause individuals to be put in the same position as the Nazi’s placed the German 
people.  The Nazi system for the generation of complicity parallels as an analogue of the kind of 
computer security issues prevalent today in which unwitting participants are co-opted into 
participation in destructive attacks on computer systems and networks.   
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CHAPTER 5.  EXPERIMENTAL MEASUREMENTS 
 
Method 
 To determine how large a problem social engineering is in a wide variety of companies 
and organizations, a survey was developed for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to 
use during its perimeter tests.  DHS sets an annual goal to survey important facilities across the 
United States and recommend simple adjustments to improve facilities’ security.  This process is 
defined as a physical perimeter test.   
 In the past, security has been focused on the physical security mechanisms at each 
location - sometimes defined as operational security.  These physical measures included things 
like locks on doors, key management, video cameras, and barriers.  However, data security has 
recently become a bigger threat and a larger security requirement due to laws such as The Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX).  As this need grew, a mechanism was needed to help provide a digital security rating for 
each facility as opposed to the physical security rating already in use.  The biggest problem with 
developing a new security rating is that the people doing the surveying or responding to the 
surveys have varying knowledge about security definitions and may not know what something 
like a firewall is.   
 As such, I developed a survey of simple yes or no questions that a tester could easily 
answer by looking around or asking a company or organization.  These yes or no questions allow 
for a digital security rating to be developed (as compared with the physical security rating 
already developed and implemented).  The survey was developed to be a simple, best-practice 
survey of a company’s general security.  This rating system defined points and security practices 
using a scale ranging from 1 (Needs Improvement) to 5 (Perfect) in each of the following three 
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areas:  confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
 This digital security rating developed was modeled after the CIA model of security —not 
defined as the Central Intelligence Agency—which also breaks security down into three 
categories of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA).  Confidentiality is defined as the 
idea that sensitive information must be available only to a set of predefined individuals. 
Unauthorized transmission and usage of information should be restricted. For example, 
confidentiality of information ensures that a customer's personal or financial information is not 
obtained by an unauthorized individual. 
 Integrity means that information should not be altered in ways that render it incomplete 
or incorrect. Unauthorized users should be restricted from the ability to modify or destroy 
sensitive information. 
 Availability states that information should be accessible to authorized users any time that 
it is needed. Availability is also a warranty that information can be obtained with an agreed-upon 
frequency and timeliness, and this is often measured in terms of percentages and agreed to 
formally in Service Level Agreements (SLAs) used by network service providers and their 
enterprise clients. 
 To view a sample of the survey, please see appendix A.   
 In addition to this security rating, a scan of social engineering exploits was performed on 
each of the surveyed sites.  All this information, along with general demographics of each 
surveyed site, was given to the researcher to analyze.  General demographics included the 
companies’ locations (Midwestern, eastern, western, or global), size (small or large), and 
category of company (manufacturing, academic, financial, media, medical, or government).  
Each of these demographic characteristics was defined subjectively by the tester except for size.  
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A small company is defined as less than 100 employees and a large company as 100 employees 
or more. 
Results 
Data was collected across 64 sites across the Midwest.  Of those, 12 were manufacturing, 
10 were financial, six were media, and 36 were medical.  Detailed results are available in 
appendix B.   
Table 1. Distribution of companies  
 Count Percentage 
Manufacturing 12 18.75% 
Small 8 12.50% 
Large 4 6.25% 
Financial 10 15.63% 
Small 4 6.25% 
Large 6 9.38% 
Media 6 9.38% 
Small 4 6.25% 
Large 2 3.13% 
Medical 36 56.25% 
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 Count Percentage 
Small 24 37.50% 
Large 12 18.75% 
 
 
The first set of results divides the companies up to see how each scored on the three security 
measurements:  confidentiality, integrity, and availability.   
Confidentiality rating of companies  
As part of the confidentiality section of the survey the agents were looking at the 
following points (to see a complete list see appendix A):   
1 - All sensitive data is encrypted. 
2 - All access to data on a “need to know” basis. 
3 - A risk assessment performed regularly by a third party with zero knowledge. 
4 - Passwords are enforced and changed regularly.   
5 - A Data Leak Protection product is in place to prevent data from leaking outside the network 
on unfirewalled ports.   
Table 2.  Confidentiality Rating of Companies  
 Count Min Max Average 
Manufacturing 12 1 4 2.333 
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 Count Min Max Average 
Small 8 1 4 2 
Large 4 2 4 3 
Financial 10 3 5 4 
Small 4 3 4 3.75 
Large 6 3 5 4.1666 
Media 6 2 4 3.1666 
Small 4 2 3 2.75 
Large 2 4 4 4 
Medical 36 1 5 2.555 
Small 24 1 4 2 
Large 12 2 5 3.666 
 
 
As we see in table 2, financial companies generally have the best scores when it comes to 
confidentiality.  A surprising low score is in the medical arena where most people assume 
confidentiality of data.  This surprises me because HIPPA regulations have been in effect for 
almost five years longer than SOX or PCI regulations.    
Integrity rating of companies 
As part of the integrity section of the survey the agents were looking at the following 
points (to see a complete list view appendix A):   
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1 - Logs are kept, maintained, and reviewed regularly.   
2 - Intrusion detection software is in place and updated regularly. 
3 - Backups are made and verified regularly and drills are performed to ensure the process of 
restore is well known.   
Table 3.  Integrity Rating of Companies   
 Count Min Max Average 
Manufacturing 12 1 3 2.08 
Small 8 1 2 1.666 
Large 4 2 3 2.5 
Financial 10 3 5 3.9 
Small 4 3 4 3.75 
Large 6 3 5 4 
Media 6 2 4 3 
Small 4 2 3 2.75 
Large 2 3 4 3.5 
Medical 36 1 5 2.97 
Small 24 1 4 2.416 
Large 12 3 5 4.08 
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As we see in table 3, large medical companies have the highest integrity, while small medical 
companies have one of the lower scores.  The lowest score goes to the manufacturing companies, 
who seem place very little emphasis on security protocols.   
Availability rating of companies 
As part of the availability section of the survey the agents were looking at the following 
points (to see a complete list view appendix A):   
1 - Backup servers are in place at an offsite location in case of failure.   
2 - Backups to the information technology staff exist and no reliability is placed solely on any 
individual.   
3 - A disaster recovery plan exists and is regularly updated and tested.   
4 - A single employee cannot do significant damage to the computer infrastructure.   
5 - Redundant systems exist for all single points of failure in the infrastructure. 
Table 4. Availability Rating of Companies   
 Count Min Max Average 
Manufacturing 12 1 4 2 
Small 8 1 4 1.87 
Large 4 1 4 2.25 
Financial 10 3 5 3.5 
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 Count Min Max Average 
Small 4 3 4 3.5 
Large 6 3 5 3.5 
Media 6 3 5 4.33 
Small 4 3 5 4 
Large 2 5 5 5 
Medical 36 1 5 2.33 
Small 24 1 3 1.70 
Large 12 1 5 3.583 
 
 
As we see in table 4, media companies dominate this category, which makes sense given that 
availability relates directly to the bottom line of any media company.  If the TV isn’t receiving a 
signal, then the media company isn’t making any money.  The lowest score is manufacturing, a 
business area that doesn’t place much emphasis on availability because information technology 
is not a core service provided.   
Small vs. large comparison 
Table 5. Average CIA ratings compared to size  
Size of Company C I A Avg 
Small 2.25 2.475 2.15 2.291 
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Size of Company C I A Avg 
Large 3.708 3.75 3.45 3.64 
 
 
As seen in table 5, large companies do better in all areas.  I assume this is because the size of the 
company usually directly relates to the size of the IT budget.  Large companies also generally 
have teams of information technology staff vs, a small company’s one or two IT employees.   
CIA average across company types 
Table 6.   Average CIA ratings compared to company type 
 C I A AVG 
Manufacturing 2.333 2.08 2 2.14 
Financial 4 3.9 3.5 3.8 
Media 3.16 3 4.33 3.5 
Medical 2.55 2.97 2.33 2.62 
 
 
As seen in table 6, the highest score across company lines, and arguably the most secure, 
would be the financial company followed very closely by a media company.  I argue that this is 
due to the modernity of the information technology infrastructure at both of these types facilities.  
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The medical industry is working on becoming digitalized, but right now, especially in small 
hospitals and medical companies, it is still a basic pen and paper method.   
ITSE vulnerabilities 
As I mentioned above, in addition to this security rating (ranging from 1-least secure to 5-
most secure) a social engineering scan was performed of the area.  To perform this scan, a DHS 
agent was trained to identify social engineering vulnerabilities.  This training was neither 
complex nor difficult as the agents already search for perimeter vulnerabilities.  Below I list 
some of the common vulnerabilities found.  There was not any company tested that did not have 
an ITSE vulnerability.   
I could provide this data linking ITSE vulnerabilities to the specific security rating of the 
company:  however, this might allow a skilled person to possibly identify the company and or 
individual whose fault this is.  Since I am not in the business of costing people their jobs, I hope 
this will provide an eye opener without providing too many specifics.   
There are two prominent ITSE vulnerabilities repeated time and time again across 
companies in the Midwest.  First is the wiring closet and second are keys.  Both of these 
vulnerabilities were seen across all sizes of companies and all types of companies examined 
here. 
Companies spend a considerable amount of time securing a server room only to leave the 
wiring closet untouched and unguarded.  Generally this is because the wiring closet also contains 
cleaning supplies, copy machines, fire alarms, or other office maintenance items.  Leaving this 
door unlocked and allowing people access to your network means that anyone can plug in a 
device and see what data is being passed around the network.  And since data in motion is rarely 
encrypted, (only one of the places examined here required encrypted communication between all 
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computers) an attacker has access to anything on your network.  Of course, this assumes that the 
attacker can gain access to the storage closet somehow.   
How many people in companies have a key to the server room?  Is the “need to know” 
principle followed or do others have access?  For example, does someone like the CEO or CFO 
have access and does he or she ever plan to be in the server room?  Janitors?  Department heads, 
housekeeping, etc?  Remember, each of these people takes their keys home, puts them on a desk 
or on top of a fridge where they can easily be stolen.  This even creates a danger for family that 
most people do not realize.   
There are a few other ITSE vulnerabilities I would also like to mention.  These all 
occurred on more than one site, and I will mention any commonality I noticed.     
A couple of the companies went through the effort of having a server room with a very 
secure door (i.e. locked with a couple different mechanisms).  Once access was granted to the 
server room, another door out of the room was clearly visible.  This back door leads to a parking 
lot and is secured by a normal lock that could be easily forced open.  Where a lot of thought and 
effort was put into door number one, door number two had little to no effort or thought put into 
it.  An attacker is like an electron, they will generally take the path of least resistance.   
A couple of companies in the smaller size category were not fortunate enough to have 
server rooms.  As such, most of the companies’ servers were sitting in a manager’s office.  
Unfortunately, both managers have an open-door policy, meaning their door is always open, 
even when they are elsewhere.   
One of the most common mistakes made by companies that have server rooms is that 
they label them.  A few companies even had signs pointing the direction towards the server 
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room.  I would hope the information technology staff would be able to find the server room 
without a sign, and I see no reason to label the server room.   
Another interesting vulnerability found, which happens a lot in the medical companies 
but is also present randomly in others, stems from tape backups (a HIPPA requirement).  
Companies generally are fairly proud of themselves for running daily backups and feel safe 
about this.  But, the two biggest conceptual problems they forget about are the fact that these 
tapes should be protected as rigorously as the original data and stored in a different location.  It 
was surprising to see how many companies performed tape backups on a daily basis and just left 
the tape on top of the tape drive.  If the server room lights on fire, so do the tapes.  The tapes 
should be taken elsewhere, but most employees classify elsewhere as home.  As mentioned 
above with the keys, it is going to be much easier to break into a home or vehicle and steal the 
tape than a server room or network.  The data needs to be protected at the same level as the 
original.   
Most manufacturing sites have very small information technology teams, usually 
consisting of only one or two employees.  Generally, this means that if one takes a vacation, no 
one really knows what is going on and even when they are not on vacation, third party vendors 
are often hired to help out.  It isn’t hard for me to pretend I am a copy repair man to gain access 
to your network. 
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CHAPTER 6.  CONSEQUENCES AND COROLLARIES 
Doing research on something like ITSE provides both hardships and benefits, which I 
would like to highlight in this section.  In addition, I will explain some of the contributions of 
this body of work, areas I think could be improved, and extensions for future work.   
 
Hardships 
One of the inherent problems with doing research on ITSE is the same thing that makes it 
a threat to security: people.  Any time people are involved in research a number of complications 
arise.  For example, I had to approve all my research through a local Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) to make sure I am not causing harm to the individuals participating in the research.  And 
since the birth of the IRB regulations can be traced back to the Nazi trials, there are quite a few 
similarities which you could see in the chapter on IT networks and Nazism:  unwitting 
participation.   
 As it is clearly seen, social engineering is not torture but simple persuasion.  The problem 
comes with the fact that the traditional IRB committee is looking for research participants’ 
informed consent.  However, once informed consent is given, then social engineering deception 
becomes impossible as they are now informed.  The logic gets inherently complex and this was 
one of the biggest challenges in my research.   
 The other challenge with social engineering is terminology.  As stated previously, the 
term “social engineering” can mean anything from the intended meaning—a social attack against 
a computer system—to the government social engineering its people to take action.  This is why 
I created the term ITSE defined as Information Technology Social Engineering.  As a result, 
once you understand what social engineering is being discussed, there is much material out there 
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defining it in very different ways.  I explored this problem above in the Chapter 2 and provided 
my own definition.       
 Another challenge I have run into is the fact that there are a considerable amount of news 
stories about social engineering on the Web.  Currently, about five new stories are posted each 
day containing the words “social engineering.”  All these stories and data would be very 
interesting things to analyze; however, the biggest problem is that very few of them have any 
relevance to the research.  This makes it very hard to find any creditable research because there 
is so much irrelevant material to sort through.  In the journal world, social engineering is too new 
of a venture for much data to be present.  The few articles I could find, I have cited in this paper.   
 
Benefits 
The last hardship, about the abundance of stories, is also a positive aspect of the research.  
Social engineering is clearly in the forefront of the media’s and researchers’ attention.  There is 
clearly interest and willingness for more information in this area of expertise.   
 ITSE is a relatively new idea and, like most things in security, is very cutting edge.  This 
means that there is a considerable amount of “new” research that needs to be done before ITSE 
can be fully understood.  For more on some of the possible new areas, please view the future 
work section below.   
 
Purpose of Work 
This research effort may seem to some scattered and random, and I would like to address 
that here.  My current research project is meant to be an exploratory study of social engineering 
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as it relates to information technology networks.  This is meant to raise awareness, create 
questions, and provide directions for people to pursue and continue the work.   
 Probably the most significant effect of this work is the fact that it raises the right kind of 
awareness.  Instead of scaring people, this research provides a framework to help people see 
some of the problems and understand some of the depth associated with the problems.  The 
raised awareness is not on the client side but on the research side:  the awareness that more work 
needs to be done and that it needs to be done in an academic, data-driven way. 
 I expect this work to raise a lot of questions, questions that I hope will turn into works of 
research.  For example, I have clearly shown there is a link between Nazi manipulation and IT 
networks, but I wonder how many jobs in information technology have that “zoning out“ effect I 
mentioned.  It is clear to me that something like database entry does, but I wonder about staff 
dealing with administration.  It would be interesting to think about how much thought goes into 
the commands system administrators type on the console while administering servers or 
machines.  I know I have mistyped a command a few times to the detriment of what I was doing.     
 
Future Work 
I envision several ways this research can be improved and expanded upon.  Let us start 
with the data collection piece and work towards the theories.  Then I will discuss some of the 
left-field directions that I think would make the research much more interesting.   
 Clearly, the data-set could use some more entries and data points.  In today’s world, there 
is no such thing as too much data, and this study is no different.  In addition to that, collecting 
more data items would be useful.  For example, I think it would be useful to collect a time 
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variable by having the agent record either subjectively or objectively how long it took them to 
find the first social engineering vulnerability.   
 As was my original plan, I think it would be interesting to take this data up higher to a 
global level and lower to a more local level.  Would it be easier to social engineer someone in the 
United States or Europe?  Or Iowa or New York?  It would be interesting to compare this to 
general assumptions about the areas such as the “niceness” of the people in the U,S. Midwest 
versus the “rudeness” of the east coast.   
 Also, due to the agents I was dealing with, the only kinds of companies I could obtain 
data for were in medical, manufacturing, financial, and media fields.  It would be nice to 
diversify this list and possibly go outside the government arm.  For example, I would love to add 
an academic category or a government category and see how they both compare.   
 At some point I envision being able to model this type of behavior using a computer test 
bed similar to ISEAGE - Internet Scale Event and Attack Generation Environment.  I know there 
are new fairly new models in the research world modeling agent-based or agent-centric 
interactions.  I think these could provide some very useful insights for my research once they 
mature.     
 I plan to continue the research and work I have started here.  The Department of 
Homeland Security will continue to provide me with data for as long as I require.  In addition to 
that, the more I wait, the more agents that will be able to assist by creating research that is 
hopefully much more diverse in both opinions and areas.  
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CHAPTER 7:  CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTION 
         Intruders are always looking out for new ways to gain access to resources such as 
computer systems or personal information, which they can use maliciously for personal gain.  
Sometime attackers get their chance due to weaknesses found in people.  These could be because 
behaviors due to trust or ignorance but could also be through simpler persuasion or manipulation.  
It is generally much easier to trick a person then it is to trick a complex computer.   
 Social engineering across information technology networks is a fairly new idea.  With all 
new ideas come new questions.  The questions raised in this dissertation only scratch the surface 
of what is out there and contributes to some of the major holes identified in Chapter 3.  This 
dissertation contributes to four major aspects of social engineering:  The history, the anatomy of 
an ITSE attack, the definition of ITSE, and examples of ITSE.   
 Chapter 2:  Definitions explains the hardships and complications due to the term of social 
engineering.  This chapter compares a variety of common sources to define a new term called 
Information Technology Social Engineering, or ITSE.  This definition helps explain the term 
social engineering as it is used in relation to security and information technology networks.  The 
term includes statements to make it both inclusive and exclusive.   
 Chapter 4:  Conceptual Models includes two different contributions.  The first half of the 
chapter discusses a variety of psychology principles and how they apply to social engineering.  
The second half of the chapter discusses one of the many origins of social engineering, 
specifically the Nazi manipulation, of its people and how this concept ties into information 
technology networks.   
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 Chapter 5:  Experimental Measurements provides concrete examples from my own 
experience and a research study I performed detailing a few examples of social engineering 
across a variety of companies along with a review of the companies’ security protocols.     
 After reading this dissertation, researchers will have new thoughts and directions to 
pursue in the complex world of information technology social engineering.    
 This paper has a very subjective emphasis.  All of the data collected on ITSE 
vulnerabilities was collected through subjective means, the attacks theorized within the 
psychology section are all subjective, and the historical comparison to the German Nazis has 
subjective overtones.  This subjective approach makes sense because social engineering, and the 
attacks associated with it, is by its very nature, subjective.   
 However, the two objective points presented in this paper are as follows:  1) The blame 
for every security breech can be placed on a person somewhere, and 2) Social engineering on 
information technology networks is a problem for all organizations no matter the size or type.     
Social engineering is an attack against the vulnerability people present within the security 
ideal.  As long as people continue to be involved with computers, people will be a weakness that 
must be considered and factored into all security decisions.  My dream is that one day, a patch 
will be developed to prevent people from being such a large vulnerability. 
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APPENDIX A.  SURVEY INSTRUMENT USED 
 
Confidentiality 
Sensitive information must be available only to a set of predefined individuals. Unauthorized 
transmission and usage of information should be restricted. For example, confidentiality of 
information ensures that a customer's personal or financial information is not obtained by an 
unauthorized individual. 
 
1. Is sensitive information encrypted? 
a.If Yes, is this information encrypted while “at rest” (ie stored on Hard Drives, Tapes, 
etc.)? 
b.Is this information encrypted while “in motion” (ie being communicated across the 
network)? 
2. Is there a verifiable account of all sensitive information that has been stored on portable 
media (laptops, PDAs, thumb drives, etc)? 
a. Are backups of sensitive data (tapes, disks, servers, co-located facilities, etc) protected to 
the same extent as the original data? 
3. Is there a policy in place enforcing the use of strong passwords? 
a. Does this policy make users change passwords regularly.   
4. Is a security awareness program in place alerting employees of possible dangers including 
phishing attacks and new viruses? 
5. Are Servers and data kept in an environment where only users who need access have 
access? 
6. Are all individuals who can access sensitive data both remotely and locally accounted for 
and trusted?   
a. How many offsite locations or people can access the data? 
 
1 - Needs Improvement Sensitive Data is vulnerable to unauthorized access.  
Employees are unaware or don't communicate concerns 
about cyber threats. 
2 - Weak Sensitive Data is kept in a controlled environment (e.g., a 
locked room) but it not encrypted.  Some sort of employee 
education program is in place to inform them of problems and 
threats.  Backup data is kept in the same room as the actual 
sensitive data. 
3 - Average Sensitive information is encrypted and stored in a controlled 
area (e.g., a locked room).  A two way communication 
mechanism is set up and used regularly to inform employees 
of threats and become aware of employee concerns.  
Passwords are regularly checked for policy compliance. 
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4 - Good Sensitive information is encrypted and stored so only people 
who need access have access to the data.  A risk assessment 
is performed annually to identify and fix vulnerabilities.  
Employees are informed of threats as soon as they become 
available including phishing attacks and viruses.  Strong 
passwords are enforced. 
5 - Perfect Sensitive information is encrypted and stored so only people 
who need access have access to the data.  A risk assessment 
is performed at least annually by an independency party with 
zero knowledge of your network to identify and fix 
vulnerabilities.  Employees are informed of threats as soon as 
they become apparent, including phishing attacks and 
viruses.  Strong passwords are enforced and changed 
regularly.  A Data Leak Protection Solution is implemented 
preventing sensitive data from leaving the network. 
 
 
 
Integrity 
Information should not be altered in ways that render it incomplete or incorrect. Unauthorized 
users should be restricted from the ability to modify or destroy sensitive information. 
 
1. Are measures taken to detect and isolate threats to your network (e.g., intrusion 
detection/prevention system, anti-virus, anti-spyware, surveillance cameras, employee 
training)? 
a. If, Yes - Are these measures routinely reviewed and/or updated? 
2. Are regular, verified backups made of sensitive data? 
3. Does each user have a separate account secured with a policy-compliant password? 
a. If Yes – Are users required to change the password at a regular interval?   
4. Is there a verifiable account of all access to sensitive information? 
a. Is this log periodically reviewed for unauthorized accesses? 
5. Is there a system in place to detect unauthorized changes to files, computer systems, and/or 
network hardware? 
6. Is all outside access logged, monitored and controlled? 
a. Are these occasionally reviewed for unauthorized access? 
 
1 - Needs Improvement No anti-spyware, anti-virus or Firewall is installed or used.  All 
users share one log in.  Nothing is logged.  No backups are 
done. 
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2 - Weak Basic logs are kept but not regularly reviewed.  Users have a 
variety of shared accounts to log into (e.g. cashiers have an 
account, managers have an account).  Basic anti-virus 
Software, anti-spyware software and firewalls are installed but 
may not be customized for your environment.  Periodic 
backups are made. 
3 - Average Users each have their own account with their own password 
to each system.  Logs are kept and reviewed regularly.  
Backups are made regularly but not verified.   
4 - Good Logs are kept of all unauthorized changes to data and 
equipment, and are reviewed regularly.  Logs of outside 
access are kept, reviewed regularly, and problems are 
investigated.  Intrusion Detection Software is installed and 
used.     Backups are made and verified regularly. 
5 - Perfect Logs are kept of all unauthorized changes to data and 
equipment, and are reviewed regularly.  Logs of outside 
access are kept, reviewed regularly, and problems are 
investigated and reported.  Intrusion Detection Software is 
installed and used to stop malicious or unauthorized access.  
Backups are made and verified regularly, and drills are 
performed to ensure the ability of all employees to restore 
them.  
 
 
Availability  
Information should be accessible to authorized users any time that it is needed. Availability is a 
warranty that information can be obtained with an agreed-upon frequency and timeliness. This is 
often measured in terms of percentages and agreed to formally in Service Level Agreements 
(SLAs) used by network service providers and their enterprise clients. 
 
1. Have efforts been made to identify and mitigate any single points of failure that may prevent 
access to sensitive data? 
2. Is there an off-site backup facility? 
3. Is a tested disaster recovery plan in place? 
4. Do multiple employees know how to support your computer infrastructure? 
5. Could any single disgruntled employee do significant damage to your computer 
infrastructure? 
a. Is this personal identified?   
b. Are measure in place to prevent data loss if this happens?   
 
1 - Needs Improvement Data is not always available when it needs to be.  Only one 
employee knows how to support your infrastructure.  No 
disaster recovery plan exists.  No single points of failure have 
been accounted for. 
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2 - Weak Data is available when it needs to be.  IT employees 
specialize and do not overlap in specialties.    A simple 
disaster recovery plan exists but it is not tested or updated 
regularly.  A single employee could do significant damage to 
your computer infrastructure. There are a large number of 
single points of failure in the network. 
3 - Average Data is available when it needs to be, even in the event of 
equipment failures (with backup servers for main systems).  
Employees are well trained to handle problems regardless of 
staffing.  A simple disaster recovery plan exists and is tested 
and updated regularly.  A single employee could not easily do 
significant damage to your computer infrastructure. There are 
a considerable number of single points of failure in the 
network. 
4 - Good Data is available when it needs to be, even in the event of 
equipment failures (with backup servers for all systems).  
Employees are well trained to handle problems even when 
many are gone.  A disaster recovery plan exists and is tested 
and updated regularly.  A single employee cannot do 
significant damage to your computer infrastructure.  An offsite-
backup facility exists. Redundant systems exist for most 
single points of failure in the infrastructure. 
5 - Perfect Data is available when it needs to be with backup servers for 
all systems both at the location and in an offsite back-up 
facility.  Any single IT employee can support the infrastructure 
of the network or a backup for each person exists.  A disaster 
recovery plan exists and is tested and updated regularly.  A 
single employee cannot do significant damage to your 
computer infrastructure. Redundant systems exist for all 
single points of failure in the infrastructure. 
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APPENDIX B.  SURVEY RESULTS 
Location Size Type Confidential Integrity Availability Avg 
Midwest 1 Financial 3 3 3 3.00 
Midwest 1 Financial 4 4 3 3.67 
Midwest 1 Financial 4 4 4 4.00 
Midwest 1 Financial 4 4 4 4.00 
Midwest 2 Financial 4 4 4 4.00 
Midwest 2 Financial 4 4 3 3.67 
Midwest 2 Financial 3 3 3 3.00 
Midwest 2 Financial 5 5 3 4.33 
Midwest 2 Financial 4 4 5 4.33 
Midwest 2 Financial 5 4 3 4.00 
Midwest 1 Hospital 1 1 1 1.00 
Midwest 1 Hospital 2 3 2 2.33 
Midwest 1 Hospital 2 3 1 2.00 
Midwest 1 Hospital 2 2 2 2.00 
Midwest 1 Hospital 1 1 1 1.00 
Midwest 1 Hospital 1 2 1 1.33 
Midwest 1 Hospital 2 2 1 1.67 
Midwest 1 Hospital 2 3 1 2.00 
Midwest 1 Hospital 1 4 2 2.33 
Midwest 1 Hospital 1 2 2 1.67 
Midwest 1 Hospital 3 2 1 2.00 
Midwest 1 Hospital 2 2 1 1.67 
Midwest 1 Hospital 2 3 2 2.33 
Midwest 1 Hospital 3 2 1 2.00 
Midwest 1 Hospital 3 3 3 3.00 
Midwest 1 Hospital 1 2 2 1.67 
Midwest 1 Hospital 4 2 1 2.33 
Midwest 1 Hospital 3 1 1 1.67 
Midwest 1 Hospital 2 3 3 2.67 
Midwest 1 Hospital 3 4 3 3.33 
Midwest 1 Hospital 2 4 3 3.00 
Midwest 1 Hospital 1 3 3 2.33 
Midwest 1 Hospital 2 2 2 2.00 
Midwest 1 Hospital 2 2 1 1.67 
Midwest 2 Hospital 2 3 4 3.00 
Midwest 2 Hospital 3 4 5 4.00 
Midwest 2 Hospital 3 4 4 3.67 
Midwest 2 Hospital 3 3 3 3.00 
Midwest 2 Hospital 5 4 3 4.00 
Midwest 2 Hospital 4 4 1 3.00 
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Location Size Type Confidential Integrity Availability Avg 
Midwest 2 Hospital 4 4 4 4.00 
Midwest 2 Hospital 4 5 5 4.67 
Midwest 2 Hospital 3 4 5 4.00 
Midwest 2 Hospital 3 5 5 4.33 
Midwest 2 Hospital 5 5 3 4.33 
Midwest 2 Hospital 5 4 1 3.33 
Midwest 1 Manufacturing 2 2 2 2.00 
Midwest 1 Manufacturing 3 3 4 3.33 
Midwest 1 Manufacturing 1 2 2 1.67 
Midwest 1 Manufacturing 2 1 1 1.33 
Midwest 1 Manufacturing 1 2 2 1.67 
Midwest 1 Manufacturing 1 2 2 1.67 
Midwest 1 Manufacturing 2 2 1 1.67 
Midwest 1 Manufacturing 4 1 1 2.00 
Midwest 2 Manufacturing 3 3 4 3.33 
Midwest 2 Manufacturing 2 2 2 2.00 
Midwest 2 Manufacturing 4 3 2 3.00 
Midwest 2 Manufacturing 3 2 1 2.00 
Midwest 1 Media 3 3 4 3.33 
Midwest 1 Media 2 2 5 3.00 
Midwest 1 Media 3 3 4 3.33 
Midwest 1 Media 3 3 3 3.00 
Midwest 2 Media 4 4 5 4.33 
Midwest 2 Media 4 3 5 4.00 
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APPENDIX C.  LIST OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING PENETRATION TESTERS 
According to Google, here is a list of companies across the United States that do penetration 
testing with a social aspect.   
 
Arizona: 
 
Phoenix IT Solutions, L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 862 
Charles Town, WV 25414 
PHONE: (304) 839-1309 
FAX:   (800) 603-5117 
E-mail us: info@phoenixitsolutions.com 
http://phoenixitsolutions.com/auditing.htm 
 
Chief Security Officers 
9821 N. 95th Street, Suite 105 
Scottsdale, AZ 85258 
Phone: 888-237-3899 
FAX: 480-275-4818 
E-Mail: info@chiefsecurityofficers.com 
Twitter: http://www.twitter.com/csokenrowe 
http://www.chiefsecurityofficers.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=100&It
emid=110 
 
 
-------------- 
California: 
 
Tevora 
2081 Business Center Dr., Suite 245 
Irvine, CA 
Tel: 949.250.3290 
Fax: 949.250.9993 
Email: socal@tevora.com 
http://www.tevora.com/View/?pid=3b2ddf389b7b42448690d3da4f0b0b9b    
 
eEye Digital Security 
111 Theory, Suite 250 
Irvine, California, 92617-3039 
United States 
http://www.eeye.com/html/services/pen-test/index.html 
 
Secure Content Solutions : 
12532 Carmel Way Santa Ana CA 92705  
(888) 299-3718  
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http://www.bestnetworksecurity.com/services/penetration-testing 
 
Redspin, Inc. 
6450 Via Real, Ste. 3 
Carpinteria, CA 
93013  
http://www.redspin.com/ 
 
Web Safe Shield 
1141 Catalina Dr.         
Suite 203       
Livermore, CA 94550 
http://www.websafeshield.com/application-penetration-testing.html?gclid=CNXk-
Ov88ZoCFc0tpAodqXOlMQ 
 
Online Security 
5870 West Jefferson Blvd., Suite A 
Los Angeles, CA 90016 
Tel: 310.815.8855 
Fax: 310.815.8808 
info@OnlineSecurity.com 
http://www.onlinesecurity.com/subcategory/page383_36.php  
 
NCC Group, Inc. 
1731 Technology Drive 
Suite 880 
San Jose, CA 95110 
http://www.nccgroup.us/penetration-testing/pen-testing.aspx 
 
Altius Information Technologies, Inc. (Directions and map) 
1506 Brookhollow Drive, Suite 122 
Santa Ana, California 92705 
Bus: (714) 442-6670 
E-mail: info@AltiusIT.com 
http://www.altiusit.com/assessmentpenetration.htm 
 
McAfee Foundstone Division Office 
27201 Puerta Real, #400 
Mission Viejo, CA 92691 
877.91.FOUND (877.913.6863) 
949.297.5600 
214.291.5317 | fax 
http://www.foundstone.com/us/services-netw-internal.asp 
 
En Pointe Technologies 
18701 S. Figueroa Street, 
72 
Gardena, CA 90248-4506 
http://www.enpointe.com/security/default.asp?Professional_Services:Security 
 
NGSSoftware US 
NCC Group 
Inc.1731 Technology Drive 
Suite 880 
San Jose 
CA 95110 
http://www.ngssoftware.com/consulting/testing/penetration-testing.php 
 
The Digitrust Group 
5757 W. Century Blvd. 
Suite 700 
Los Angeles, CA 90045 
http://www.digitrustgroup.com/assessment.html 
 
Microland 
2880, Zanker Road, 
Suite # 210, 
San Jose, CA 95134 
Tel : +1 408 435 9999 
Fax: +1 408 435 9939 
http://www.microland.com/infrastructure-management/network-vulnerability-assessment-
penetration-testing.html 
 
AsTech Consulting 
601 Montgomery Street 
Suite 688 
San Francisco, CA 94111 
http://www.astechconsulting.com/security_assessment.html 
 
Symantec 
20330 Stevens Creek Blvd. 
Cupertino, CA 95014 
http://www.symantec.com/business/solutions/focus.jsp?solid=telco&solfid=tc_testing 
 
Network Security Solutions Americas LLC 
712 W. Onstott Road, Suite 106, Yuba City, CA 95993 
http://www.mynetsec.com/services/penetration-testing-vs-vulnerability-assessment 
 
Wipro Technologies 
http://www.wipro.com/webpages/itservices/infrastrucmgmt/penetrationtesting.htm 
 
Emagined Security 
2816 San Simeon Way 
73 
San Carlos, CA 94070 
Main: 888.235.1906 
Fax: 775.205.2988 
Email: info@emagined.com 
http://www.emagined.com/security_penetration_testing.php 
 
InfinIT  
2051 Junction Avenue 
Suite 208 
San Jose, CA 95131 
http://www.infinitconsulting.com/consulting/network-design/network-audit.html 
 
--------------- 
Connecticut: 
 
Audit Serve 
27 Pine Street 
Suite 700 
New Canaan, CT 06840 
http://www.auditserve.com/consulting/consult_PEN.htm 
 
Integralis Inc. - Connecticut 
111 Founders Plaza, 13th floor 
CT 06108 East Hartford 
Tel: +1 860 291 0851               
Fax:+1 860 291 0847 
E-Mail: us.info@integralis.com 
http://www.integralis.us/Page-15794/Page-16097/Page-16601/Page-16513/Page-16543.html 
 
Hill & Associates 
44 Erdmann Lane 
Wilton, CT 06897 
http://www.hill-assoc.com/web/Portal?xml=services/service_detail&fid=19&cid=70 
 
 
--------------- 
District of Columbia: 
 
Control Risks 
1600 K Street, NW 
Suite 450 
Washington, DC 20006 
Tel: + 1 202 449 3330 
Fax: + 1 202 449 3325 
Email: crwashington@control-risks.com 
http://www.controlrisks.com/default.aspx?page=951 
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--------------- 
Florida: 
 
The Wackenhut Corporation 
4200 Wackenhut Drive 
Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410 
800.275.8310 
www.ci-wackenhut.com 
 
Secnap 
6421 Congress Avenue, Suite 206 
Boca Raton, Florida 33487 
http://www.secnap.com/products/security/penetration-testing.html 
 
Enterprise Risk Management 
Douglas Entrance 
800 Douglas Road 
North Tower, Suite 835 
Coral Gables, FL 33134 
Phone: (305) 447 - 6750 
FAX: (305) 447 - 6752 
Email: info@emrisk.com 
http://www.emrisk.com/ITSecurity/penetration_testing.aspx 
 
Amgentech, Inc. 
20533 Biscayne Blvd, Suite 41311 
Aventura, FL 33180 
Phone: (305) 937-4449 
Fax: (786) 513-0487 
Toll-free: (866) 937-4449 
Emergency Hotline: (866) 267-7395 
http://www.amgentech.com/InfoSec.html 
 
Thales e-Security Inc. 
2200 North Commerce Parkway 
Suite 200 
Weston, Florida, 33326 
Tel: +1  1 888 744 4976  
or + 1 954 888 6200 
sales@thalesesec.com 
http://iss.thalesgroup.com/en/Services/ICT%20Security/Security%20Audit/Penetration%20Testi
ng.aspx 
 
 
---------------- 
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Georgia: 
 
SecureWorks Corporate Headquarters 
PO Box 95007 
Atlanta, GA 30347 
Main: 404-327-6339 
Toll-free:  877-905-6661 
Fax:  404-728-0144 
http://www.secureworks.com/services/professional/penetration_testing.html 
 
Greyhat, LLC. 
Atlanta, Georgia, USA 
http://greyhat.com/pen/  
 
ControlScan 
340 Interstate North, Suite 347 
Atlanta, Georgia 30339 
https://www.controlscan.com/products_professional_services.php 
 
Vigilar 
900 Ashwood Parkway 
Suite 290 
Atlanta, GA 30338  
http://www.vigilar.com/services/pentrationTesting.php# 
 
RBTI 
http://www.rbt-inc.com/services/pentest.html 
 
 
---------------- 
Idaho: 
 
En Garde Systems, Inc 
18352 S. Crossbill Rd. 
Couer d'Alene, ID 83814 
http://www.engarde.com/enterprise/pentest.php 
 
---------------- 
Illinois: 
 
Trustwave 
70 West Madison Street 
Suite 1050 
Chicago, IL 60602 
P: 312-873-7500 
F: 312-443-8028 
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https://www.trustwave.com/elements-pentration-testing.php  
 
---------------- 
Louisiana: 
 
TraceSecurity Corporate Headquarters 
TraceSecurity, Inc. 
5615 Corporate Blvd. 
Suite 200A 
Baton Rouge, LA 70808 
Phone: (225) 612-2121 
Fax: (225) 612-2115 
http://www.tracesecurity.com/solutions/penetration_testing.php 
 
---------------- 
Maryland: 
 
Password Crackers, Inc 
http://www.pwcrack.com/penetration.shtml 
 
Chesapeake NetCraftsmen, LLC. 
1290 Bay Dale Drive – Suite #312 
Arnold, MD 21012 
Telephone: 888-804-1717 
E-mail: info@netcraftsmen.net 
http://www.netcraftsmen.net/Security.htm 
 
Vesaria 
722 Dulaney Valley Road, Suite 192 
Towson, MD 21204 
443 - 501 - 4044  
http://www.vesaria.com/Network-Assessment/Penetration-Testing/ 
 
Kore Logic 
P.O. Box 357 
Deale, MD 20751  
http://www.korelogic.com/assessment_overview.html 
 
 
---------------- 
Massachusetts: 
 
Core Scurity Technologies 
41 Farnsworth St 
Boston, MA 02210 |  USA 
Ph: (617) 399-6980 | Fax: (617) 399-6987 
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http://www.coresecurity.com/content/contact-us 
 
Rapid7 
545 Boylston Street 
Boston, MA 02116 
Tel: 617.247.1717 
Fax: 617.507.6488  
http://www.rapid7.com/services/pentest.jsp 
 
SystemExperts Corporation 
11 Spiller Road 
Sudbury, MA 01776 
http://www.systemexperts.com/penetration-testing-exposure-profiling.html 
 
Akibia 
4 Technology Drive 
Westborough, MA 01581 
http://www.akibia.com/solutions/support/ 
 
NSG 
100 Cummings Center, Suite 421-G 
Beverly 
Massachusetts  
http://www.nsgroup-inc.com/services.html 
 
 
---------------- 
Michigan: 
 
Samsa 
5560 Gratiot, Suite D 
Saginaw, MI 
http://www.samsa.com/products_services/penetration-testing.htm 
 
Rehman 
5800 Gratiot Rd. Suite 201 
Saginaw, MI  48638 
Phone: (989) 799-9580 
Fax: (989) 799-0227 
http://www.rehmann.com/default.cfm?t=service_industry.cfm&L2=TECHNO&L3=SECURE 
 
 
---------------- 
MIssouri: 
 
BKD 
78 
Hammons Tower 
901 E. St. Louis Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 1900 
Springfield, MO 65801-1900 
417.831.7283 
FAX 417.831.4763 
http://www.bkd.com/service/riskmanagement/informationsecurity/Penetration.htm 
 
 
---------------- 
New England: 
 
RVASI   
P.O. Box 541025 
Omaha, NE 68154 USA 
http://www.rvasi.com/services/apptest/ 
 
Solutionary 
9420 Underwood Avenue, 3rd Floor 
Omaha, NE 68114 
Phone: 402.361.3000 
Toll Free: 866.333.2133 
Fax: 402.361.3100  
http://www.solutionary.com/solutions_services/tas_epa.html 
 
---------------- 
New Hampshire: 
 
Adaptive Communications, LLC 
325 Corporate Drive, Suite 150 
Portsmouth, NH 03801 
Phone: 603-433-1700 
Fax:     603-334-6501      
Email: info@adaptcom.com 
Website: www.adaptcom.com 
http://www.adaptcom.com/penetration_testing.cfm 
 
 
---------------- 
New Jersey: 
 
Millennium Consultants, Inc. 
2 Riverview Drive, 
Suite 200 Somerset, 
NJ 08873, United States 
Tel: (732) 562 0200 
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Fax: (732) 562 8500 
Email: millennium@millenniumci.com  
http://www.millenniumci.com/penetration-testing.htm 
 
Pivot Point Security 
957 Route 33, Suite 111 
Hamilton, NJ 08690 
http://www.pivotpointsecurity.com/-application/ 
 
Icons Inc. 
4 Independence Way 
Princeton, NJ 08540 
Phone: 609.720.1600 
Fax: 732.875.0780 
http://www.iconsinc.com/s_consulting.html 
 
Miles Technologies 
300 West Route 38 
Moorestown, NJ 08057 
http://www.milestechnologies.com/PublicPages/IS-Penetration-Testing.aspx 
 
 
---------------- 
New Mexico: 
 
EC-Council 
North American Operations Division 
3819 Osuna NE 
Albuquerque, NM 87109 
http://www.eccouncil.org/egs/PenetrationTesting/PenetrationTesting.html  
 
---------------- 
New York: 
 
IBM Corporation 
1 New Orchard Road 
Armonk, New York 10504-1722 
United States 
914-499-1900 
http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/index.wss/offering/gts/a1029491 
 
Gotham Digital Science LLC 
26 Broadway 
Ninth Floor 
New York, NY 10004 
Phone: +1 (212) 514 8318 
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Fax: +1 (646) 349 3911 
Email: info@gdssecurity.com  
http://www.gdssecurity.com/i/pt.php 
 
Synesis IT 
44 Wall Street, 12th Floor 
New York, NY 10005 
Tel: (212) 608 6112 
Toll Free: 1.877.HI.SYNESIS 
info@synesisit.com 
http://www.synesisit.com/solutions/penetrationTesting.jsp 
 
Marvin and Company, P.C. 
Attention: IT Services 
11 British American Blvd, 
Latham, New York 12110 
Phone: 1-(518)-785-0134 
FAX: 1-(518)-785-0299 
Email: security@marvincpa.com 
http://www.marvinitservices.com/pen.html 
 
WhiteHat Inc. 
300 International Drive 
Williamsville, New York  
http://www.whitehatinc.com/gc.php?p=7 
 
 --------------- 
North Carolina: 
 
ATTUS Technologies, Inc. 
15800 John J. Delaney Drive, Suite 250 
Charlotte NC, 28277  
http://www.attustech.com/External_Penetration_Test.aspx 
 
 
---------------- 
Ohio: 
 
Microsolved 
2330 Briggs Road 
Columbus, OH 43223 
http://www.microsolved.com/files/awareness_brochure.pdf 
 
 
----------------- 
Pennsylvania: 
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White Badger Group 
One Tek Park, Suite 200 
9999 Hamilton Boulevard 
Breinigsville, PA 18031 
http://www.whitebadger.com/solutions_penetration.asp 
 
AccessIT Group Inc. 
2000 Valley Forge Circle 
Suite 106 
King of Prussia, PA 19406 
Phone: 610. 783. 5200 
Fax: 610. 783. 5151 
http://www.accessitgroup.com/services/penetration.php 
 
AppLabs 
1515 Market Street 
Suite 1110 
Philadelphia 
PA 19102-1905 
http://www.applabs.com/html/webapplicationpenetrationtesting.html 
 
----------------- 
Tennessee: 
 
Sword & Shield  
1431 Centerpoint Drive, Suite 150, Knoxville, TN 37932-1984 
Voice: +1 865.244.3500 Fax: +1 865.244.3599 
http://www.sses.net/services/penetration_testing 
 
 
----------------- 
Texas: 
 
NSS 
20333 State Highway 249, Ste 200 
Houston Texas 77070 
281-378-1551 
http://www.netsecuritysvcs.com/menu/penetration-test 
 
Digital Defense, Inc. 
9000 Tesoro, Suite 100 
San Antonio, TX 78217 
Toll Free: 888.273.1412 
Local: 210.822.2645 
Fax: 210.822.9216  
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http://www.cusecure.com/solutions/security/penTest.php 
 
Appin Technologies 
9600 Great Hills Trail Suite 150W 
Austin Texas 78759 
Tel: +1-512-502-3032 
Email: austin@appinonline.com 
http://www.appinlabs.com/ethical-hacking.php 
 
atsec information security corporation 
9130 Jollyville Road, Suite 260 
Austin, TX 78759 
Phone:  +1-512-615-7300 
Telefax: +1-512-615-7301 
eMail:  info@atsec.com 
http://www.atsec.com/01/it-security-services-penetration-testing.html#down 
 
The Garland Group 
2610 West FM 544 
Wylie, Texas 75098 
http://www.thegarlandgroup.net/services/penetration-testing/ 
 
InfoDefense 
401 E. Corporate Drive 
Suite 100 
Lewisville, TX 75057-6426 
http://gov.infodefense.com/services/pentesting_mss.html 
 
  
------------------- 
Utah: 
 
The Cadence Group 
750 E 9000 S, Suite A 
Sandy, UT 84094  
http://www.thecadencegroup.com/soceng.html 
 
Security Metrics 
462 East 800 North 
Orem, UT 84097 
https://www.securitymetrics.com/pentest.adp 
 
------------------- 
Virginia: 
 
Prolific Solutions, LLC 
83 
Midlothian, VA 23112 
http://prolific-solutions.net/services.htm 
 
Plynt 
12801 Worldgate Dr., Ste 500 
Herndon, VA 20170, USA 
Phone: +1-703-871-3934 
Fax: +1-703-871-3936  
http://www.plynt.com/penetration-testing-value/  
 
SecureInfo 
1410 Spring Hill Road 
Suite 250 
McLean, VA 22102 
703.245.9770 phone 
703.245.8442 fax  
http://www.secureinfo.com/solutions/threat-management/penetration-testing.aspx 
 
Syrinx Technologies 
7109 Staples Mill Road., #281 
Richmond, VA 23228-4110 
http://www.syrinxtech.com/index.html 
 
Prometheus Global, Inc.         
14121 Parke Long Court, Suite 220, Chantilly,VA 20151 
http://www.progllc.com/services/security-services/pentesting.html 
 
Control Case 
2010 Corporate Ridge, Suite 700 
McLean, VA 22102 USA 
Voice: 703.483.6383 
Fax: 703.636.4888 
http://www.controlcase.com/managed_compliance_penetration_test.php 
 
 
------------------ 
Washington: 
 
Coalfire 
150 Nickerson Street, Suite 106 
Seattle, WA 98109 
Phone: 206.352.6028 
Fax: 206.633.0235  
http://www.coalfiresystems.com/penetration_testing.aspx 
 
IOActive 
84 
Corporate HQ (Seattle) 
701 5th Avenue, #6850 
Toll Free: 866.760.0222 
Fax: 206.784.4367 
http://www.ioactive.com/penetrationtesting.php 
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